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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT ISRAELI DILEMMA
After their blitzkrieg victory over the Arabs during the so-called
"Six- Day War" in June of ±96j, Israeli hopes for peace were high. Arab
military forces had been shattered and Israel held the Sinai Peninsula, the
Gaza Strip, the west bank of the Jordan River, and Syria's Colan Heights.
The closing of the Suez canal served to deprive Egypt of an important source
of revenue . Jordan was reduced to a rump desert . In Syria, the Israeli
army was encamped just a short drive away from Damascus. It seemed that
from its position of strength, the Israeli government would be in a good
position to dictate peace terms to the Arabs, who would be anxious to
retrieve as much of their lost real estate as possible.
But peace did not come. "The war is over," said Moshe Dayan, Israeli
Minister of Defense, "Now the trouble begins." * This view has been proven
more realistic than Israeli expectations for peace. Instead, the June I96J
,
hostilities have only hardened the will of the Arabs in their confrontation
with Israel. The Soviet Union has replaced most of the Arab armament lost
during the fighting. Not only is Israel still surrounded by increasingly
efficient Arab armies, but with the more distant frontiers that must be
defended and the longer lines of communication and supply, Israeli armies no
longer have the mobility that they once had and which was of such decisive
importance in their previous armed clashes with the Arabs
.
In addition to the administrative problems and expenses faced by Israel
as a result of the necessity of administering and defending the occupied

territories, Israel is being confronted with a constantly increasing tempo
of Palestinian refugee guerrilla activities. The June 1967 defeat of the
Arab armies on the battlefield, the subsequent occupation of the Arab lands,
and Israeli retaliatory raids in response to guerrilla campaigns and border
incidents have acted as a catalyst to fuse Arab support behind these
resistance movements of the Palestine refugees.
As of mid-May I969, since the conclusion of open hostilities, 27U
Israeli soldiers and ^8 civilians had been killed and 1,3^-3 Israelis had
been wounded in Arab guerrilla attacks. This toll is constantly being pushed
higher by the almost daily attacks of these resistance forces. c-
In their quest for political control of Palestine, both peoples have
paid dearly in the destruction of human values. Thousands of lives have
been lost and many persons have been seriously wounded. Over three-quarters
of a million have been made homeless and have been forced to live in abject
poverty in squalid refugee camps . Forecasts for the future in the Middle
East fortell of no end to this unfortunate tale of human suffering for many
years to come.
As the continuing guerrilla raids extract a higher and higher toll, .
the Israeli government is under constantly increasing pressure to take mili-
tary action designed to put a halt to such activities. This could well mean
a renewed total assault on the surrounding Arab countries. However, not
only would such a renewal of full scale hostilities again result in widespread

destruction of lives and bring untold misery and suffering to additional
hundreds of thousands of people, but it could also trigger a nuclear con-
frontation bet\;een the world's major powers, with its attendant widespread
devastation.
II. THE CENTRAL LEGAL POLICY ISSUES
What is the scope and adequacy of the limitations imposed by
international lav/ on claims to the use of intense coercive measures by the
participants in hostilities involving a resistance movement such as has
developed in the Middle East following the Israeli occupation of Arab lands?
In view of the constantly increasing number of resistance or liberation
movements taking place in many parts of the world today, the answers to
issues raised by this question are of significance not only in the limited
context of the Arab- Israeli conflict, but many of the principals involved
are equally applicable to these other coercive situations.
Three central legal policy issues are involved in the basic question.
First, are resistance forces such as those engaged in the conflict with
Israel entitled to the protections of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention
of 19^9? This question is deliberately posed first as it should be considered
in a context devoid of any claims as to the justness or legality of the
causes of the resistance movement. The second legal issue is whether the
conduct of the Israeli occupation, if in violation of accepted rules of

international law, gives the Palestinian people the right to resort to self-
defense. Subsidiary to this issue is the question of what the world community
can and should do to ensure compliance with the laws of war which set minimum
standards for the conduct of a belligerent occupation. The third legal
issue is what are the levels of violence that should be permitted in the
conduct of hostilities involving resistance movements? These legal issues
will now be examined seriatim.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE ON- GOING PROCESS OF
COERCION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The coercive situation that prevails in the Middle East today is not
something that developed suddenly. The roots of the conflict go back many
years. Considering this fact, the very nature of the conflict, the long-
standing history of the use of coercive means by those directly concerned
in the struggle, and the many conflicting claims of the participants, it is
not possible to make a rational appraisal of the legal significance of the
present-day coercive measures being taken by these participants without first
making a systematic inquiry into the fundamental factors that have led up to
and are responsible for the conflict. The resistance movement of the Pales-
tine refugees is but a symptom of the basic conflict between the opposing
forces of political Zionism and Arab Nationalism. Tnese symptoms should not
be viewed in a vacuum. Rather, they must be examined in the context of all
of the relevant facts and circumstances that preceeded and, in effect, caused

the development of the present-day Palestine refugee resistance movement.
The historical account that follows does not purport to cover every
event in the development of the Arab- Israeli confrontation. However, an
attempt has been made to touch on the most significant events and factors
that have led up to and are involved in the present conflict.
A. Factual Background of the Establishment of the State of Israel and
the Creation of the Palestine Refugee Problem
1. Jewish Historical Connection With Palestine
After struggling for centuries with the Canaanites, the Phoenicians,
the Armaeans, and the Philistines, the Hebrews finally managed to secure a
kingdom of their own in Palestine. In 1000 B.C. a Hebrew dominion under
King David stretched from Damascus to Arabia. After King Solomon's death
in 935 B.C., the kingdom was split into Israel and Judea. During the fol-
lowing centuries, the Hebrews lost their hold on most of Palestine and in
70 A.D. Roman legions captured Jerusalem, the Hebrew's last stronghold,
killed a large number of Jews, and burned Solomon's temple. An unsuccessful
revolt in 137 A.D., led by Simon Bar Kochba, was the last major attempt for
many centuries to create a Hebrew state. With hope for the re- establishment
of such a state gone, Judaism shifted its emphasis to spiritual rather than
secular salvation. The idea of a return to the Holy Land became a spiritual
rather than a practical goal. 3 Palestine was thought of as a center of
Jewish religion and culture rather than as a land over which it was neces-
sary or desirable for the Jews to obtain political control.

2. The Advent of Political Zionism
Although a sort of cultural or emotional Zionism, a fondness or
longing for the land of David, had been an integral part of the heritage of
Judaism since the Diaspora (scattering of the Jews throughout the old world,
generally dated from the destruction of Solomon's temple), it wasn't until
the latter part of the nineteenth century that serious suggestions that a
Jewish homeland be founded in Palestine began to be advanced. The growing
persecution of Jews in Russia convinced many that the only hope for Russian
Jews lay in immigration. From time to time, various Zionist movements
advocated immigration of Jews to Palestine. However, these movements did
not gain widespread support among Europe's Jews. Those in Eastern Europe
preferred immigration to the United States, while those in Western Europe
were relatively assimilated, felt no threat to their welfare, and so had no
k
real desire to immigrate to the somewhat barren Middle East.
The founder of the Zionist movement that ultimately resulted in the
creation of the State of Israel was Theodor Herzl, a lawyer- journalist, who
came from a wealthy Jewish family in Budapest. As a result of his observance
of the trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, Herzl reached the conclusion that
assimilation of Jews was impossible and that the only answer to anti-Semitism
was for the Jews to return to Palestine and establish an independent state.
Despite the fact that Dreyfus was subsequently completely vindicated, Herzl
continued to maintain these beliefs. It was under Herzl 's stimulus that
in 1897, the World Zionist Movement came into being at the First Zionist
Congress held in Basel, Switzerland. '

The depth of Herzl's "belief that anti-Semitism is inevitable and
inescapable is illustrated in his statement that:
.... The Jewish question exists wherever Jews live in
perceptible numbers. Where it does not exist, it is carried
by Jews in the course of their migrations . ... This is
the case in every country, and will remain so, even in
those highly civilized— for instance France— until the
Jewish question finds a so3.ution on a political basis.
The unfortunate Jews are now carrying the seeds of
Anti-Semitism into England; they have already introduced
it into America. °
As a solution to the problem of anti-Semitism, Herzl proposed:
Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the
globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of
a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves
.
The creation of a new State is neither ridiculous nor
impossible. We have in our day witnessed the process
in connection with nations which were not in the bulk
middle class, but poorer, less educated, and consequently
weaker than ourselves. The Governments of all countries
scourged by Anti-Semitism will be keenly interested in
assisting us to obtain the sovereignty we want. '
The primary goal of the Zionist movement was the creation of a Jewish
state which was to be a national home for the Jewish people. Zionism offered
a specific ideology concerning the nature of Jewishness in the modern world,
o
in which the Jewish nation would play a key role. Zionism differed from
the usual nationalistic movements in that the members of the group aspiring
to sovereignty were scattered rather than concentrated in a particular geo-
graphical area. Like most nationalistic movements, though, Zionism created
a strong sense of social cohesion among its adherents through a common myth;

6in this case, identification with a religious- historical Jewish heritage
and the "belief in a revived Jewish creativity in Palestine .
"
Working diligently on the idea of a Jewish state, in 1901 and again
in 1902, Herzl tried to persuade Abdul Haraid, Sultan of the Ottoman Empire,
to designate Palestine as a home for the Jews. While the Sultan permitted
the entry of individual Jews, he rejected Zionist proposals for mass immi-
gration. Failing in those attempts, Herzl negotiated with the British and
ultimately secured an offer of territory in Uganda, which was then a
British protectorate. However, while Herzl pressed hard for the acceptance
of the Uganda offer, the Seventh Congress of the World Zionist Organization,
held in 19Oo, two years after Herzl' s death, definitely rejected the proposal,
Zionist sentiment was now solidified, resolutely and uncompromisingly, behind
the concept that the Jewish state must he in Palestine. -1-
In 1906, when the World Zionist Organization decided to press for a
Jewish Home in Palestine, there were ahout 50,000 Jews living there. At
that time, Palestine was a land of basic religious tolerance and tranquility.
For several centuries, religious peace had "been the rule, and animosity the
exception. -1-1
The die having been cast, the Zionists stepped up their efforts to
promote immigration to Palestine, which was still under Turkish domination.
By 191^, sn "the eve of World War I, the Jewish population had risen to 84,700
out of a total 689,000. 12
'

After the outbreak of World War I, prior to engaging in military cam-
paigns in the Middle East against Turkey, the British made political
overtures to both the Jews and the Arabs, looking towards the eventual
13independence of both Jewish and Arab states. In return, the British
lU ishoped for and did receive both Arab and Jewish J cooperation in their
conflict with the Axis .
As the war progressed, British Zionist leaders found the British
Cabinet willing to turn a sympathetic ear toward their cause, which was
persuasively advocated by Dr. Chaim Weizmann. On llovember 2, 1917 j after
several months of difficult negotiations, Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour




I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of
His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy
with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to,
and approved by, the Cabinet
'His Majesty's Government view with favour the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the
Jev;ish people, and will use their best endeavours to
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the
rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
other country'
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration
to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Yours
(signed)
A. W. James Balfour
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The Balfour Declaration, as finally issued, was the product of many
drafts, revisions, and much compromise. In addition to the political promise
clause sought by the Zionists, it contained two safeguard clauses designed
to protect the rights of the Palestinian Arabs and of the Jews in countries
other than Palestine. These safeguard clauses were included principally
through the efforts of anti- Zionist Jews, Edwin Montague and Claude Montefiore,
The resulting document was highly ambiguous. The terminology used, especially
in the political promise portion, was not precise, either in a legal or in
a literal sense.
The Declaration mentions a "national home" for the Jewish people. Does
this mean a Jewish state or simply a Jewish settlement or community? Who are
the "Jewish people" that the document refers to? The location of the home is
to "be "in Palestine." Does this mean that the home is to be in a portion
of Palestine or is the entire country to constitute the home? What are the
borders of the Palestine referred to in the Declaration? What would be the
effect of a violation of the safeguard clauses?
The foregoing and many other questions that might be raised about the
Declaration did not cause the Zionists undue concern. Their attitude towards
the entire document is well summed up in a statement made by Dr. Ueizmann
regarding the safeguard clauses: "It would mean exactly what we would make
it mean . . . neither more nor less."
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Despite the loose wording and the ambiguities, the Balfour Declaration
proved to "be a formidable instrument in the hands of the Zionists, who
regarded it as a contract binding Britain to support the founding of a
Jewish state in Palestine. Interpreting the Declaration as being without
safeguards, they claimed that they had the charter that Herzl had dreamed
of and, as subsequent events would show, they made very effective use of it.
3. The Mandate Years
After the Turkish surrender in 1918, a British Military Administration
was set up in Palestine. At San Remo, in 1920, the League of Nations agreed
to grant a mandate to Great Britain, which established a civil government
in Palestine on July 1, 1920. " At the conclusion of the war, in the
Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed on July 2k, 1923, Turkey renounced all
rights to territories outside its borders, as established in the treaty,
leaving the future of these territories to be settled "by the parties
concerned." 20 Qn September 29, 1923, the League of Nations formally
ratified the mandate
.
In Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant it was provided that
the wishes of the communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire
must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. However,
the Middle East mandates were assigned without regard to the wishes of the
inhabitants, which had been clearly indicated in the report of the King- Crane
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Mission that had "been sent to the area by President Wilson. This report
indicated that while independence was preferred, if there had to be assist-
ance, the majority of the population of Palestine preferred American to
21
British assistance. The report also indicated that nearly nine- tenths
of the whole non- Jewish population of Palestine were emphatically against
the whole Zionist program, which included the idea that sooner or later
22Palestine would be organized as a Jewish commonwealth.
As might be expected, the Arabs accepted the mandate without enthusiasm.
Having managed to get their foot in the door, the greatly encouraged Zionists
immediately began to exert increased efforts to the sponsoring of immigration
into Palestine. At first, Jewish immigration was not very heavy and, while
there was occasional sporadic violence, the Arab and Jewish communities
lived in relative peace and harmony. However, in the late 1920' s Jewish
immigration began to rise. As immigration increased and as the Jews
acquired more land, Arab anxieties increased. Disputes arose over immigration
regulations, religious sites, land ownership, and Jewish union policies.
All this time, Arab resentment was gradually growing. ^
Tension between the Arab and Jewish communities continued to mount. In
August of 1929, serious hostilities broke out between the Arabs and Jews
following an incident at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, that began with an
anti-Arab demonstration by young Jewish nationalists. Unrest and fighting
soon spread to Hebron and to other nearby communities . By the time the
hostilities were concluded, 133 Jews and 116 Arabs had been killed.
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Gradually, the attitudes of the Palestine Arabs hardened as more of then
"began to accept the leadership of Jaj Amin El Hus seine, the Grand Mufti of
Jerusalem, who tool; an extreme stand against Zionist objectives and advocated
a resort to force, if necessary, to block their aspirations. During this
time of growing nationalism, the three-cornered struggle for Palestine had
the effect of strengthening the forces of both Arab nationalism and Zionist
political nationalism and of bringing the two into direct confrontation. ^
Ifl 1933, with the rise of Ilazi power in Germany, immigration figures
climbed beyond the wildest dreams of the Zionists. The number of Jewish
immigrants rose from 9,553 in 1932 to 30,327 in 1933 • In addition, between
26
1932-33 there were some 22,000 illegal immigrants who entered Palestine.
In 1936, resentful of the increased Jewish immigration and despairing
that their claims and demands for independence would ever be met by the
British, the Arabs launched a series of violent disorders all over the country,
These disorders were directed at both the British and the Jews . By the
summer of 193&, the disorders had assumed the aspect of a small war. Arab
peasants carried on a campaign of sabotage and attacks against both British
troops and the settlers in Jewish colonies . Small armed bands carried on
guerrilla warfare from the hills . '
The British Government, after re-examining the whole Palestine problem,
issued what has come to be known as the White Paper of 1939 • In this docu-
ment, it was stated that for the following 5 years Jewish immigration would
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"be limited to a maximum total of 75>°GO, after which there would "be no
immigration, except with the acquiescence of the Arabs of Palestine.
Restrictions and prohibitions were also placed on the acquisition of Arab
lands. The Unite Paper also stated that: "His Majesty's Government now
declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine
should become part of a Jewish State."
The Zionists, refusing to be set back by the Uhite Paper, went under-
ground. They were determined to continue the immigration by illegal means,
if necessary. Efforts to train their secret army, the Haganah, were stepped
up. The more extreme groups started to prepare a campaign of violence and
terror
.
The outbreak of Uorld War II in Europe produced a sort of truce in
Palestine, however, this did not last long. Many Zionists felt that Britain
had broken the terms of the Mandate and had condemned thousands of Jews to
death by the application of strict immigration quotas . Britain, to many,
appeared to be the real enemy of the Jewish people
.
In 19^4, before the war in Europe had ended, the Zionists inaugurated a
wave of terror in the Middle East . The more moderate of the terrorist organi-
zations, the Irgun Zvai Leumi (national Military Organization), had
approximately 200 dedicated activists among its ranks in l^kk, ** In
addition to acts of terrorism against the British, the Irgun advocated and
51
carried out a policy of reprisals to counter attacks by Palestinian Arabs.
.
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The other terrorist organization, the Lohmey Herut Israel (Lechi), "better
known as the Stern Gang, had far fewer members than Irgun, but also had
much less restraint. **
The Irgun, Lechi, and Palmach (the striking force of the Haganah) struck
repeatedly. Among the more notorious of the Zionist acts of terrorism was
the assassination on November 6, 19^, of Lord Moyne, British Minister of
State in the Middle East, by two Stern Gang gunmen 33 &n^ the July 22, 19^6
explosion of bombs planted in the basement of the King David Hotel in
Jerusalem by the Irgun. The attack on the King David Hotel resulted in the
Ikdeath of over 200 persons, including 15 Jewish civilians. J In order to
accomplish their aim of driving the British out of Palestine, the Zionists
were ready to go to any lengths, including the murder of their own people.
On November 26, 19^0, the refugee transport ship PATRIA i/as blown up within
sight of land. Of the 1,800 passengers, more than 250 were lost. Ten years
after the incident, it was discovered that the ship had actually been blown
•35
up by the Zionists to arouse anti-British sentiment. Jy In attempting to
counter the Zionist terrorism, by January of ISkj, more than 80,000 regular
British troops and 16,000 policemen were stationed by Britain in Palestine.
However, even with one soldier or policeman for every 18 civilians, pacifi-
cation efforts were unsuccessful.
Over a period of 25 years there had been various outside investigations
carried on in Palestine and many reports filed. However, none had proposed
a solution that was acceptable by both the Arabs and by the Zionists. Britain's
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resources were almost exhausted . Finally, seeing that resolution of the
situation was beyond means at its disposal, Britain decided to leave Pales-
tine. On February 1^, 196"J, the British announced that they had decided to
refer the Palestine problem to the United Nations.
The report of a United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, published
on September 3> 19^7> recommended that the mandate be terminated . On
November 29, 19^7, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a plan for
the partition of Palestine. *' While the Zionists were not completely satis-
fied with the amount of territory awarded to them in the Partition Plan, they
considered it to be the best deal that they could get under the circumstances
and so were willing to go along with the plan. The Arabs, on the other
hand, refused to concede to the Zionists a right to Jewish sovereignty over
any part of Palestine. 3"
The Arabs began to organize forceful resistance to the plan. With the
evacuation of the British, there being no internal or external power willing
or able to enforce the peace, armed hostilities continued to increase and,
as May Ik, 19^8, the official date for the termination of the mandate approached/
the flames of war continued to mount in the Holy Land
.
k. Termination of the Mandate; Creation of the
Refugee Problem
The flight of the Palestinian Arabs began on a small scale during the
early phases of the hostilities. As the conflict intensified, their flight
grew to greater proportions. Immediately after the General Assembly passed
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the partition resolution, following serious clashes between the Arab and
Jewish communities, some 30,000 upper and middle class Arabs, including
most Arab leaders, fled from Palestine to safer areas. As the fighting
spread and intensified, thousands more fled their homes to escape areas of
40
combat and to seek food and other necessities
.
As the British withdrew, the Arabs in Palestine were left without any
government or necessary governmental services . With the detrimental effect
that this had on their morale, the Arabs were ready for mass flight. The
Arab communities became easy prey to rumor and exaggerated atrocity stories,
whether with or without foundation.
On April 9> 19^8, the Irgun and the Lechi attacked the Arab Village
of Deir Yassin. According to Menachem Begin, the Irgun commander, the pur-
pose for the taking of Deir Yassin was to establish an airfield, which was
subsequently constructed and which, for a time, served as the only means of
communication between besieged Jerusalem and the coast. Before the attack
on Deir Yassin, a loudspeaker was used to exhort all women, children and aged
to leave their houses and to take shelter on the slope of a nearby hill.
According to Begin:
A substantial number of the inhabitants obeyed the warning and
they were unhurt. A few did not leave their stone houses
—
per-
haps because of the confusion. The fire of the enemy was murderous
—
to which the number of our casualties bears eloquent testimony
J% killed and nearly kO wounded, with kO per cent of the attackers
suffering casualtie_s7« Our men were compelled to fight for every
house; to overcome the enemy they used large numbers of hand-grenades.
And the civilians who had disregarded our warnings, suffered
inevitable casualties . ^
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In the attack on Deir Yassin, 250 Arabs, including women and children
were killed by the Jewish forces and a number of the bodies were thrown into
UP
the village well. Once news of the brutal massacre became known, the
Haganah denied having any part in the operation carried on by "dissident"
groups. The Jewish Agency issued a statement expressing its horror and
regret and even cabled the release to King Abdullah ibn-Husein of Transjordan,
The Arabs, however, did not believe that the Irgun was solely responsible. ^3
Begin clears up this point with his statement that: "Dir Yassin was captured
with the knowledge of the Haganah and with the approval of its Commander."
According to Begin, "The enemy propaganda after Dir Yassin was designed
to besmirch our name . In the result it helped us . Panic overwhelmed the
Arabs of Eretz Israel .... In the rest of the country too, the Arabs began
to flee in terror before they clashed with Jewish forces." ^5
Another example of the type of tactics used to cleanse Arab districts of
their Arab inhabitants is illustrated by the actions of Yigal Allon in
Galilee, in May of 19^8. Allon used Jewish mukhtars (mayors) who had con-
tact with local Arabs to spread rumors and urge the flight of the Arabs. In
some areas, the resulting Arab exodus resulted in the capture of key points
without the firing of a shot. ^°
With the growing numbers of Zionist military victories, the flight of
the Arabs before the onrushing Zionist armies gathered momentum until it
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carried away nearly the whole of the Palestine Arab community. By the time
armistice agreements had been signed and open hostilities ceased, the number
of Arab refugees had grown to well over three-quarters of a million. Even
after the signing of the armistice agreements, additional thousands of Arabs
hi
were expelled from Israeli controlled territory.
The Israelis claim that at no. time did they envisage a mass departure
of the Arabs. They maintain that from the very start, the State of Israel
held out the hand of friendship to the Arabs and that Israeli authorities
exerted their utmost to prevent the mass flight. They further maintain that
the Arab exodus took place at the behest of Arab military commanders and
political leaders who persuaded the Arab populace that evacuation to neigh-
boring countries would be brief and that they would soon be able to return
behind the victorious Arab armies and share in the spoils . However, no
evidence has ever been found that would prove that any Arab government asked
kg
the Palestinians to flee. '
The Arabs, on the other hand, maintain that the refugees were forcibly
dispossessed and expelled through the use of terrorism and other coercive
measures by the Zionists in a coldly calculated plan to rid Israel of its
Arab inhabitants. -*
Even if the Zionists did, at the beginning, attempt to prevent the
exodus of the Arab masses, it is clear that as the war progressed they gave
up any effort to halt the Arab's flight. The Zionists actually began to
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regard their leaving as "beneficial. Not only did the Arab exodus eliminate
many military problems, hut it also assisted in the development of the new
state by freeing Arab lands for confiscation and settlement by Jewish
immigrants. ^ As Sir John Bagot Glubb, the former commander of the Arab
Legion has pointed out: "It is certainly true that if the Arabs had not left,
the Jewish State would have been unworkable . To what extent they were intent-
ionally driven out by *a few calculated massacres', no gentile will probably
ever know." '
5- The June 1967 War; Creation of Additional Refugees
On May 18, I967, Gamal Abdel Nasser demanded the withdrawal of the
United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF), that had been stationed in the Gaza
Strip and at Sharm el Sheikh, at the mouth of the Gulf of Aquaba, since the
Israeli evacuation following the conclusion of hostilities in 1956. Since
the UNEF had been stationed on Egyptian soil with Egypt's consent, once that
consent had been withdrawn, the Secretary- General of the United Nations had
no real choice but to withdraw the troops . There were no UNEF units on
Israeli territory as Israel had refused to grant permission for their presence
By May 22, 1967, the last units of UNEF were withdrawn. " Nasser then
announced that the Straits of Tiran was closed to Israeli shipping.
There has been much speculation as to what impelled Nasser to so
drastically accelerate the intensity of the confrontation with Israel. It
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may be that he felt that a stunning victory over the Israelis was necessary
for him to be able to silence critics at home and to recoup his declining
prestige among the other Arab nations in the Middle East. Perhaps Nasser
thought that Israel would not use military force, or if Israel did, that his
armed forces would be able to secure some initial victories and that the
major powers would then step in and stop the fighting. Once he had taken
the initiative in escalating the intensity of the confrontation, Nasser was
unable to back down. The tempo and temper of the Arab polemics quickened.
Egyptian troops were moved into the Sinai. The response of the Israelis was
the initiation of full-scale hostilities.
The United Nation's initial call for a cease-fire was ignored by all
participants in the hostilities. Ultimately, the parties did agree on a
cease-fire, but not until the Arabs realized that they were hopelessly beaten
and that no third party was going to come to their aid. The Arabs then
grasped at the demanded cease-fire as a means of stemming the Israeli advance,
By this time, the Israelis had substantially accomplished their aims and
needed a respite to digest the new territories that they had seized . As
Israeli forces accomplished their objectives, cease-fires were agreed upon
with their Arab opponents.
During and also after the end of the June 1967 war, by the use of
psychological and economic measures, as well as by the utilization of some
more direct means, the Israelis once again encouraged and assisted in an
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exodus of Arabs into Arab controlled territories. Many of the same factors
that contributed to the Palestine Arab exodus of 19^8, contributed again in
I967. Large numbers fled from sheer panic generated by the fighting and by
the fear that physical harm might be suffered at the hands of the victorious
Israelis. By the end of August 1967, at least 113,000 of the refugees from
the 19^8 war had fled or been expelled into neighboring Arab states . However,
nearly 550,000 of the approximately 1,350,000 United Nations Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA) registered refugees remained under Israeli rule. 5^
B. The Impact of Zionism in the Middle East
1. The "Jewish People" Concept
One of the basic tennents of political Zionism is the idea that all Jews,
no matter where they reside and whatever their nationality, constitute "one
people." Israel is, according to Zionists, the homeland not only for its
own citizens, but for all Jews. Illustrative of Zionist thinking on this
matter is a statement of David Ben-Gurion that "When a Jew in America or
South America speaks of 'our government ' to his fellow Jews, he usually
means the government of Israel, while the Jewish public in various countries
view the Israeli Ambassador as their own representative." 55
One of the first goals of the World Zionist Organization was to get
their "Jewish People" nationality claims recognized in international law.
Although the Balfour Declaration rejected their claims, they have consistently
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represented it as supporting them. The World Zionist Organization continued
to press for recognition of their "Jewish People" nationality claims and
of their status as the authorized (though self- proclaimed) spokesman for
that entity in public law contexts.
In Israel's Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, the
Zionist "Jewish People" nationality concept is given considerable emphasis. 5°
The concept that Israel is the creation of and the homeland of all Jewish
people is also enunciated in the World Zionist Organization— Jewish Agency
(Status) Law, which was enacted in 1952. The first two paragraphs of the
Status Law provides:
1. The State of Israel regards itself as the creation of
the entire Jewish people, and its gates are open, in
accordance with its laws, to every Jew wishing to immigrate
to it.
2. The World Zionist Organization, from its foundation five
decades ago, headed the movement and efforts of the Jewish
people to realize the age-old vision of the return to its
homeland and, with the assistance of other Jewish circles and
bodies, carried the main responsibility for establishing the
State of Israel. 57
2. Jewish Rejection of Zionist Ideology
Many Jews have tended to react emotionally to the problems of the
State of Israel and to give it all-out financial, political, and moral sup-
port. 5o Israel was founded under a cloak of humanitarism and many, if not
most, Jews continue to have a sentimental attachment to Israel as well as an
interest brought on by fear of anti-Semitism, which is both promoted and
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exploited by Zionists. However, even without evidence of overt anti-Semitism,
the very real and extreme terrorism practiced against the Jews by the Nazi
regime is not something that is easy for humanitarians of any religion to
forget. Although the subject is one that most Jews are quite understandingly
reluctant to discuss, many must have in the back of their minds the feeling
that if conditions were right, the same thing could happen in any country
and that perhaps someday they too might need a place where they could find
shelter and protection. 59 This fear alone would be enough to make a con-
siderable number of Jews quite apprehensive whenever they feel that the
continued existence of Israel is in the balance. When the need arises, they
do not hesitate to dig deeply into their pockets to help Israel. The Jews
concern for Israel's fate is well illustrated by the statement of a Zionist
writer that:
j/ln June of 196j/ anxiety among Jews for Israel's fate rose to
a fever pitch almost immediately, and by the time the war began had
expressed itself in an unprecendented outpouring of monetary
contributions . Even Jews who had never publicly identified
with Israel's cause suddenly showed their solidarity. The total
collected and pledged in gifts and loans throughout the world
was about $350 million, which made it likely that Israel, in
spite of the drain caused by the war, would end the year with
higher reserves in foreign currency than at the beginning. °°
While it is obvious that a fair proportion of Jews outside of Israel
identify with and have a considerable amount of sympathy for the problems of
Israel, this does not necessarily mean that they agree with or accept Zionist
dogma such as the "Jewish People" concept, with all of its many implications.
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In the United States there have been many hitter struggles between and among
those Jews who are Zionist, anti- Zionist hut pro- Israel, and those who are
anti- Zionist and anti- Israel.
Clearly, there is widespread rejection among Jews in the United States
and elsewhere of the Zionist dogma that Israel is the representative and
guardian of the rights and interests of Jews wherever they may he and that
these Jews owe primary allegiance to Israel rather than to the country in
which they are "temporarily" residing. Not only is there a rejection of
this ideological concept, hut many Jews feel that they are endangered and
thus are angered at the Zionist attempts to block the assimilation of Jews
into the population among which they reside. Addressing himself to this
subject, Dr. Elmer Berger, an American Jew who has been a critic of Zionism
has said:
What is incomprehensible, illogical, absurb, is that the State
of Israel with seeming impunity, is permitted to operate part
of its government in the United States, in direct impact upon
United States citizens and in support of this conflicting poli-
cy. What is further incomprehensible, illogical and absurb is
that the United States Government leaves United States citizens
vulnerable to' exploitation by the foreign sovereignty for ex-
tracting funds and political support to operate the machine
and program which is admittedly designed to persuade these
Americans to support the policy of the foreign state and
ultimately to expatriate themselves . "2
In their attempts to block assimilation of Jews, one of the Zionists'
chief weapons is their promotion of anti-Semitism. The Zionists promote
and exploit anti-Semitism as a means of documenting and bringing home to
Jews the idea that it is impossible for Jews and those of other religions
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to "become a single, integrated community and that, therefore, a physical
separation is the only practicable way out. -* That Zionists look with
favor on anti-Semitism is well illustrated by a statement in Davar , the
official organ of the Marpai party, Israel's leading political party:
I shall not be ashamed to confess that, if I had power
and I have the will, I would select a score of efficient
young men— intelligent, decent, devoted to our ideal and
burning with the desire to help redeem Jews— and I would
send them to the countries where Jews are absorbed in
sinful self-satisfaction. The task of these young men
would be to disguise themselves as non-Jews, and plague
Jews with anti-Semitic slogans, such as, 'Bloody Jew',
'Jew go to Palestine', and similar intimacies I I can
vouch that the results in terms of a considerable immi-
gration to Israel from these countries would be ten
thousand times larger than the results brought by
thousands of emissaries who have been preaching for
decades to deaf ears. °4
When it comes to the subject of anti-Semitism, Zionists seem to be
anxious to get the word out. For example, on April 19, 19&9* the Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith reported that more than one- third of the
65Nation's citizens holds anti-Semitic beliefs. y Not only does the promotion
of anti-Semitism serve to discourage the assimilation of Jews, but it is also
used by Zionists to help silence those who might dare to oppose Zionist and
66Israeli policies. Anti-Semitism is also used by the Zionists, along with
some other equally questionable methods, to help bludgeon from Jews the huge
financial support required by the Zionist undertakings . Referring to some of
these methods, one Jewish author, Henry Hurwitz has stated:
/a/s is well known, a very large proportion of the supposedly
voluntary philanthropic donations are extracted from business
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and professional men on threats of punitive, economic and
social sanctions. This must be described as what it is
—
a species of terrorism. Such terrorism has become a most
effective technique in large Jewish fund raising. '
Senator William F. Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has referred to the Zionist fund raising operations as a conduit
through which more than one million tax free dollars a year has passed for
use in political lobbying and propaganda in the United States. These were
funds that had ostensibly been raised for humanitarian purposes. The
American Zionist Council has also been used as a conduit of funds to avoid
6Q
compliance with the Foreign Agents Registration Act. '
While, by various means, the Zionist organizations have been able to
enlist a considerable amount of moral and financial support for Israel, this
does not necessarily indicate widespread acceptance of Zionist ideology. In
fact, the refusal of Jews to abandon their homes in the Western World and to
"return" to Israel, is clear evidence of rejection of a basis principle of
Zionism. In discussing the failure to properly tap this large reservoir of
aliya
,
former Prime Minister Levi Eshkol has indicated that out of a total
of one- and- a- quarter million immigrants to Israel during the seventeen years
preceding I967, only sixty- two thousand came from the United States, Canada,
England, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and from Western Europe and
South America; an average of only about 3> 600 a year. '
Not only has there been a failure of Western Jews to respond to the
Zionist call for a return to their "homeland," but even in Middle East
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countries where the position of Jews has not "been made untenable as an
indirect result of the Arab- Israeli conflict, Jews do not rush to heed the
Zionist call. For example, there are still 60,000 Jews living in Iran,
where they enjoy freedom of worship and full citizenship rights . ' As a
matter of fact, this was the situation of the Jews living in all of the
Middle East countries prior to the advent of Zionist- Arab conflict. All of
the religious communities, Moslems, Christians, and Jews, regulated their
life in accordance with the principles of their faith. The religious minori-
ties lived in automomous communities under their own laws . The Jews were, in
a number of ways, integrated into Arab society. Their mother tongue was the
Arabic language, which was also the medium of their literary and other
72intellectual products .
3. Arab Rejection of Zionism
The deeply engrained hostility of the Arabs to Zionism, and thus to
Israel, results from a number of factors. Basically though, their fear of
and rejection of Zionism is based on their opposition to the apparent aims of
Zionism and the methods used by Zionists in carrying out these aims. '3 Three
grievances most often mentioned by Arabs in denouncing Zionism and Israel are
the supposed Zionist expansionist aims, Israel's discrimination against the
Arabs, and Israel's treatment of the Palestine refugees. A brief look at the





The boundaries of the biblical and historical "Promised Land" supposedly
ran from the Nile to the Euphrates. This, in the Arab view, is what the
Zionists intend to have as the boundaries of the State of Israel.
Over the years, according to an Israeli government source, the area
known as "Palestine" has been v/hittled down considerably. It has gone from
45,000 square miles prior to 1922, to 10,000 square miles in 1922, to 7,993
square miles at the time of the 19^9 armistice. '
The Arabs feel that, because of the limited amounts of land available
in Israel for cultivation, Israel's current policy of encouraging large scale
immigration will ultimately lead to increasing threats against the territory
of the surrounding Arab states. 75 This policy of wholesale immigration,
without regard to the absorbtive capacity of the country, has raised the
Jewish population of Israel from about 650,000 in 1948, to 2,239,200 by the
end of 1964, and to over 2,500,000 in 1966. 7° During the seventeen years
preceding 1967, Israel absorbed an average of 73*000 immigrants a year. '
'
That Zionist leaders did not consider the borders of Israel, as they
were constituted in 19^9, as permanent is illustrated by the statement of
David Ben-Gurion, who was then the Prime Minister of Israel, that:
... I add now that it (Israel) has been established in only a
portion of the Land of Israel. Some are hesitant as to the
restoration of our historical frontiers, fixed and set from the





Events have shown that the Arab fears of Israeli territorial expansion
are not entirely groundless. Israel gave up Arab land seized during the 1956
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hostilities only because of extreme pressure by the United States. At the
present time, not only does Israel continue to occupy all of the Arab terri-
tory seized during the June 19&7 war, but Jerusalem has been annexed and it
appears that Israel intends to hold on to part, if not all, of the remainder,
Commenting on July 5, I96Q, on Israel's expanded frontiers, General Dayan
said:
Since the return to Zion a hundred years ago a double process of
colonization and expansion of frontiers has been going on. We have
not yet reached the end of that road. It is the people of Israel
who will determine the frontiers of their own State. 79
Israel's leaders have not precisely defined how much Arab territory,
occupied since the 1967 hostilities, that they intend to keep. However,
Premier Golda Meir has stated that Israel's frontiers must provide "no
natural advantage to our neighbors." ^°
t>. Treatment of Arab Refugees
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Everyone has the right to leave any country including his own,
and to return to his country. 81
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 19*+- (ill), adopted on
December 11, 19^+3, and repeated in substance every year since 19^-8, provides
that:
/¥Jhe refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at
peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at
the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should
be paid for the property of those choosing not to return . . . . "2
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Spokesman for the Palestine refugees contend that the attitude of the
refugees has been made clear since 1948. They continue to maintain that it
is their lawful right and desire to return to their former homes in Pales-
tine. 83
The Arabs insist that Israel must abide by the United Nations resolution,
The Israelis, on the other hand, maintain that the resolution did not call
for an immediate repatriation of the refugees and that this is recognized
by the inclusion in the resolution of the words "at the earliest practicable
date." Their view is that the use of these words admitted that it was not
then practicable for the Arab refugees to be returned. What is required,
they maintain, for this "suspensive condition" to be satisfied is a return
to normal conditions, i.e. a general settlement of all of the major Arab-
Israeli differences . °^
In the Israeli view, the Arabs should not have fled in the first place.
An Israeli government publication states:
160,000 Arabs
. . .
held their ground, discounted the
intimidation and stayed unharmed in their villages . Through
natural increase their number has since risen to over 220,000.
They are citizens of Israel, enjoying equal rights and
opportunity with Jews . °5
As far as the Arabs that left are concerned, and especially in view of
the hostile attitude cf many of them towards the Government of Israel, the
Israeli position is that their return would introduce a fifth column within
Israel's borders. As Mrs.' Golda Meir has stated:
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For 20 years the refugees were kept in camps . The textbooks
printed with the money of the United Nations were full of
hatred for Israel, with wonderful examples of how there were
five Israelis, we killed three, how many are left? Now the
little boy who was five is now 25. He is maybe Fatah Jan
Arab commando7 now. Now we are asked to give them a free
choice to come back. This is a fifth column that we are
asked to take . °o
Israel's supporters also advance the theory that the situation should
be looked upon as a population shift . The claim is made that between 19^7
and 1963, about 650,000 Jews were uprooted in African and Middle Eastern
countries and were absorbed by Israel. They also reportedly collectively
9)7
left behind property valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
The claim has also been made that the refugee situation is being used
as a political football by the Arab governments. As Robert Galloway, a
former UKRWA representative to Jordan has reportedly said:
It is perfectly clear that the Arab nations do not want to
solve the refugee problem. They want to keep it as an open
sore, as an affront against the United Nations, and as a
weapon against Israel. Arab leaders don't give a damn
whether the refugees live or die. °°
In support of this theory, it is pointed out that some of the Arab nations,
such as Syria and Iraq are greatly underpopulated and could absorb all of the
Oq
refugees with ease. y
The Arabs, on the other hand, maintain that the reason why Israel
prevents the return of the refugees is because of the Zionist inspired con-
cept that Israel should be a Jewish state and the more Jewish the better.
That this was one of the early goals of the Zionist movement is clearly shown
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in the statement in the report of the King- Crane Commission that:
. . .
The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's
conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists
looked forwarded to a practically complete dispossession
of the present non- Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by
various forms of purchase . 90
That the Zionists have not lost sight of this goal is clearly reflected
in their actions in actively assisting in the exodus of Arabs both at the
time of the founding of the State of Israel and in 196?.
Various reasons are given for the failure of the Arab countries to
absorb the refugees. The primary reason advanced is that the refugees desire
to return to their homeland and so do not wish to be assimilated into their
host or other Arab countries . Tnere are other practicable reasons that are
also advanced. Egypt, though large in land area, has very little land that
maybe cultivated. Egypt is considered to be overpopulated and cannot phy-
sically absorb any appreciable number of refugees . Lebanon has a touchy
political situation, with its population about evenly divided between
Christians and Moslems. It is feared that allowing the refugees living
there, who are mostly Moslems, to become citizens, would upset the religious
balance among the population and could cause serious political difficulties
.
Jordan, because of limited amount of land suitable for cultivation, can
absorb only a limited number of refugees. The countries with the greatest
absorbtion potential are probably Syria and Iraq. However, even in these
nations, the problem of absorbtion would not be simple. In the first place,
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these governments could not give consideration to the refugees over their ovn
citizens in the parceling out of land. Also much of the land is privately
owned, even if not cultivated . To purchase the land, bring it under culti-
vation, and to construct the necessary dwellings would require a great deal
of money.
°1
Despite what is c3.aimed "by Zionist propaganda of the hard and callous
attitude of the Arab governments toward the Palestine refugees, the refugees
host countries of Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon have been fairly generous
and hospitable to the refugees and have spent more than $100,000,000 on
direct assistance to them. 92
c. Discrimination Against Arabs
In the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel it is
provided that:
The State of Israel will . . . foster the development of the
country for the benefit of all inhabitants; it will be based
on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of
Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and politi-
cal rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion,
race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience,
language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy
Places of all religions; . . .
We Appeal - ... to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel
to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State
on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation
in all its provisional and permanent institutions. 93
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Speaking about the apartheid policy practiced by the Government of
South Africa, before the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1963,
Mrs. Golda Meir, who was then Israel's Foreign Minister, stated:
The people of Israel feel deep abhorrence for all forms of
discrimination on the grounds of race, colour or religion.
This stems from our age-old spiritual values, and from our
long and tragic historical experience as a victim of man's
inhumanity to man. We therefore naturally oppose policies
of apartheid, colonialism and racial or religious discrimi-
nation wherever they exist . 9 !
Vfiiile Israel's official attitude is one of nondiscrimination, as Arabs
are quick to point out, that has not been the policy put into actual practice.
There are numerous ways in -which the Arabs in Israel are discriminated against
According to a poster issued in Jerusalem in 1958, and which is signed by
Professors Martin Buber, E. Simon, and A. Bonne', of the Hebrew University,
and others
:
The bulk of Israel's Arab population is subject to a military
rule that denies them the basic rights of any citizen. They
have' no freedoin of movement or residence; they are not accepted
as equal members of the trade unions and are not employed on
the same basis as others in most organizations or government
departments. Their entire life depends on the good graces of
the military governors and their aids. Government ministries,
in fulfilling their duties, help the Arabs in the fields of
agriculture, health, education, etc., but the system of mili-
tary government casts its heavy shadow over all these
benefits. 95
Discrimination against Arabs in Israel is even written into law. Under
the Nationality Law of 1952, ° Jews can obtain instant citizenship by
"returning" to Israel. The same lav;, however, by providing a system of
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qualified eligibility, has effectively deprived a great number of indigenous
Palestine Arabs, who are residents of Israel, of the rights and benefits of
citizenship. Another example of laws that have discriminated against Arabs
in Israel is the Absentees' Property Law of 1950. Under this law, land
owned by Arabs who had fled from their homes during the fighting in 19^8,
was seized even if they had only gone to the next village for safety and had
returned to their homes the next day.
In addition to statutory discrimination, there is discrimination against
Arabs in Israel in many other more subtle ways, such as in employnent, rights
to travel, the expropriation of Moslem religious (Waqf ) foundations, and, in
general, relegation of the Arab minority to a class "B" category.
"
4. Rejection of the Zionist "Jewish People"
Concept in Public International Law
Clearly, no state can afford to subscribe to a dogma that maintains
that a portion is its populace owes primary allegiance to another government.
To so recognize would be an abdication of part of the sovereignty of that
state to a foreign government. Beginning with the second safeguard clause
of the Balfour Declaration, it can be said that the Zionist "Jewish People"
nationality claims are not considered to be recognized in public international
law. 99
So far as American lav; is concerned, recognition of the "Jewish People"
nationality claims would be prohibited by the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Such recognition has also been specifically rejected
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by the United States Department of State in a letter to Dr. Elmer Berger,
Executive Vice-President of the American Council for Judaism.
C. The Palestinian Arabs' Response
1. The Development of Guerrilla Warfare
Nearly a century and a half ago, Karl von Clausewitz observed:
. . . When, as in Spain . . . the war is for the most part
carried on by means of a people's war ... a tru2y new power
is formed and . . . people ' s warfare introduced a means of
1 fSn
• defense peculiar to itself. -LWJ-
Although sometimes given a variety of names such as "unconventional",
"unorthodox", or "underground", almost all types of irregular warfare are
commonly referred to today as "guerrilla warfare." Guerrilla bands have
played a considerable part in almost every war in modern history. Since the
beginning of World War II, guerrilla action has become more and more prominent
as a substitute for conventional warfare.
Guerrilla warfare is usually resorted to as a means of minimizing an
adversary's relative advantage either in numerical strength or armament. It
is the weapon of the weak. Utilizing this form of warfare, the strategi-
cally weaker side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times,
and places. It is not used in preference to regular warfare, but is used
when and where the possibilities of regular warfare have been foreclosed. It
is used before regular forces have been created, after regular forces have
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been defeated, and where regular forces are unable to operate . ^
Guerrilla warfare is a way of harassing and wearing down the enemy while
developing one's own strength. If the adversary puts a lev; value on the task
of defeating the guerrillas and does not commit its full resources to the
struggle, this form of warfare may be decisive itself. In most cases, how-
ever, the weaker side must eventually shift from guerrilla operations to
irk
regular warfare to achieve victory.
During World War II, the Germans encountered guerrilla activity through-
out their areas of operations . Since the conclusion of the war, there have
been numerous occurrences of guerrilla warfare throughout the world. While
such activity has been successfully combatted in areas such as the Philippines
and Greece, guerrilla forces have achieved notable successes in such places
as Algeria, Cuba, and China.
2. Pre- I96T Use of Guerrilla Warfare Against Israel
By July 20, 19^9> the last of the four armistice agreements had been
signed. For the Arabs, a battle had been lost but the war was not over.
They adopted an official policy of belligerency without open armed hostilities
.
The cease-fire lines became the de facto boundaries. Drawn on large scale
maps by men primarily interested in military considerations, the arbitrary
demarcation lines paid little attention to civilian realities . In many
instances, villages were divided from their fields and from their wells and
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orchards. As might "be expected, Arab refugees soon "began to filter across
the armistice lines to try to harvest their crops, to work their lands, and
to reclaim some of their personal possessions.
In the beginning, most of the border crossings were individual affairs
for the purpose of recovering property or for personal reasons. Israel
pursued a tough policy against all infiltrations, whether with innocent
objectives or not. The Israelis met these infiltration with force and soon
there was an increasing cycle of infiltrations, incidents, reprisals, and
raids
.
While most of the early raids into Israel were carried out by private
individuals and groups on their own initiative and without any direction
from the Arab governments, the Israelis assumed that all raids were the
responsibility of the Arab host states and carried out retaliatory attacks
against Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, regardless of the immediate responsibility
for the specific border violations . Force was met by even greater force and
unofficial violence was met by official retaliation.
Many of the raids into Israel were made by individuals or groups of
refugees living in the Gaza Strip. Israel, in turn, retaliated with large
scale attacks on the Gaza Strip. In 1955 > after several such attacks on the
Gaza Strip, Nasser began to seek and to obtain advanced weapons and to train
Palestinian Arabs for future reprisal assaults on Israel. In late August of
I965, these Egyptian- trained Palestinian Arab guerrillas, called fedayeen
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(men of sacrifice), began to make raids deep into Israeli territory. ^
Having become increasingly concerned about the violent fedayeen raids,
one of the main objectives of the Israeli Sinai campaign of 1956"> was to
destroy the fedayeen bases in Egypt and to discourage further fedayeen
attacks, -"-^d £ far as g^ort term results were concerned, this objective
was largely accomplished. As a result of Israel's military activity and
the subsequent stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the
Egyptian side of the Gaza demarcation line, fedayeen and other kinds of
107illegal border crossings were brought to a virtual halt. ' However,
as far as long range results were concerned, the Sinai campaign did nothing
to remove the underlying causes nor to alleviate the symptoms of Arab hos-
tility towards Israel. As might have been expected, the respite from
fedayeen activity was only to be temporary.
In 1956, during the temporary occupation of the Gaza Strip by Israeli
forces, young Palestinians formed a new underground movement called "Al
Fatah." Following the conclusion of the 1956 hostilities, Egypt was no
longer in a position to give shelter and encouragement to the new fedayeen .
Syria, on the other hand, was able and willing to do so. In 196^, Al Fatah
began to conduct raids designed mainly to disrupt Israeli water projects by
dynamiting water pipelines, pumpts, and wells. Although Al Fatah '
s
home
base was in Syria, it was easier and safer to cross the Israeli- Jordan
109border than the Syrian- Israeli frontier. The continuing raids of
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Al Fatah and other fedayeen forces out of Syria and across the Jordanian
"border, with no apparent Syrian or Jordanian restraint, resulted in consider-
able casualties and property damage in Israel.
The Egyptian government had assumed responsibility for the 1955 - 19^6
fedayeen activity as a reply to Israel's retaliation raids, however, the
hosts of the fedayeen of the mid- I960' s officially disclaimed any responsi-
bility. Needless to say, this disclaimer had no effect on Israel's
official policy of replying to raids within Israel with armed reprisals.
While the fedayeen of the mid-1960's may have enjoyed some measure of
independence, they were extremely dependent on their host governments not
only for substance, but also for the supply of weapons and other equipment
needed to conduct their guerrilla activities. In actual practice, they were
still being used as pawns in the struggles of Arab power politics.
Just as the efficacy of the fedayeen raids in 1955 - 19&6 was a contri-
butory reason for Israel's march into Sinai, in 19&7* the fedayeen raids
again helped to produce in Israel a nearly irresistible determination to
react. 12-L
3. The Modern Palestine Arab Resistance Movement
a. The Impact of the June 1967 War
For 20 years, while living in subsistence level refugee camps, the
spirit of the refugees had been sustained by promises of the Arab nations that
Israel would be defeated and that the refugees would be able to return to
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their homes . The stunning victory of the Israeli forces in the June 1967
hostilities, however, served to make crystal clear what should have been
readily apparent after Egypt's defeat in 1956"; the Arab nations could not
deliver on their promises in 196*7 > and probably couldn't for decades to
come.
On paper, the military balance had seemed to be overwhelmingly in favor
of the Arabs. The Arab armies greatly outnumbered the Israeli army and
possessed the latest in armament. However, they were no match for the
well- honed Israeli military machine. There are many reasons for the impotence
of the Arab armies. One of the most important factors was the superior
training of the Israeli soldier. All Israelis between Y{\ and l8|, except
for Arabs, mothers, the insane, pregnant women, and those who take an oath
that military service violates religious principles, are subjected to uni-
versal military training. After their release from active training duty,
the conscripts are assigned to a frontline reserve unit until age 39, when
they are transferred to a home guard or civil defense unit until they reach
50 years of age. Virtually all Israelis are literate. On the other hand,
Egypt and Syria, for example, have just under a 30 per cent literacy rate
.
The Egyptian and Syrian armies were largely a conglomeration of illiterate
peasants serving upper- caste officers whose main interest in military life
was the path it provided to high office in a government ruled by soldiers
The common soldier had little to fight for. Faced with the realization that
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he really had little to gain from victory, he was more interested in staying
112
alive than in killing Israelis.
In addition to deficiencies in leadership, training, and morale among
their armed forces, the Arab nations had internal problems that prevented
them from throwing their full weight into the fray, as Israel could do. The
Egyptians had troops tied up in Yemen. Iraq had its own problems with a
Kurdish minority in its northern mountains. For one reason or another, the
various Arab pledges to Nasser simply didn't materialize.
In the aftermath of the defeat of the Arab armies, Palestinian leaders
realized that if they were ever going to return to their homes in Palestine,
it would have to be by their own hands and not by those of the Arab nations
surrounding Israel. Taking the destinies of the Palestinian people fully
under their cam wing, the Palestinian fedayeen organizations began to emerge
with genuine separate identities from their host governments
.
b. The Battle of Karameh
On March 21, 1968, Israeli forces launched a massive attack against
Karameh, a city that had been built by the 19^8 refugees and which was located
on the east bank of the Jordan River. The Israelis expected minimal resist-
ance on the part of the Jordanian army and the Palestine commandos
. However,
while the Israeli forces did eventually take Karameh, they did so only after
a number of very hard- fought battles with Palestinian resistance forces.
After capturing the city, the Israelis used dynamite charges to destroy

hk
- Karameh' s two main schools, the mosque, the pump house, field irrigation
units, and UHRWA food storage "buildings. As the Israelis "began to withdraw,
combat was resumed . While the Israelis carried off as much of their damaged
equipment as they could, a number of tanks and other vehicles and equipment
was abandoned under fire . On the following day, the captured armament was
paraded through the streets of Amman before cheering crowds. While the
Israeli forces did take Karameh, its Palestinian defenders had fought courage-
ously and well and with a number of acts of heroism on the part of members
of the resistance forces. For the Palestinian fedayeen , the battle for Kara-
meh was a psychological victory. The myth of the military invincibility of
Israeli forces had been destroyed. Within the next few weeks, thousands of
young men and women had volunteered for service with the fedayeen . A turning
point had been reached . ^-3
Money also began flowing to the commando movement. Many businessmen at
rich oil centers such as Dhahran in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, voluntarily
began to contribute 5 percent of their salary to the fedayeen organizations
.
King Faisal of Arabia, is said to have contributed $^-,500. Money also began
to come in from various Arab governments, from oil rich Arab sheiks, from
benefit drives, from the sale of Al Fatah stamps and posters, and from numer-
ous other sources . 11^' One commando, who goes by the code name of Abu El
Fuhad, is from the royal family in Kuwait. Contributing the equivalent of
$3 million .when he joined the movement, he then turned over his monthly pay
of just under a million dollars . Palestinians all over the Arab world have
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been asked to give 5 per cent of their monthly salary to the movement . ^J
The fedayeen are now fairly well equipped with weapons as an indirect
result of the June 19^7 hostilities. After the fighting subsided, they were
able to obtain a considerable amount of armament left on the battlefields by
the retreating Arab armies. For two weeks following the ending of hostilities,
commando teams scrambled about the Sinai desert to col3.ect machine guns,
rifles, grenades, various other weapons, and ammunition before they were
found by the Israeli salvage squads . ^°
The morale of the fedayeen is high. A member of one of the commando
organizations occupies a position of prestige and respect. Each week, hun-
dreds of Arab newspapers and magazines sing the praises of new heroes and
fallen martyrs . There is no higher honor for a man walking on the streets
of Amman than to be recognized as an accomplished commando with many crossings
of the Jordan River to his credit. ^-7 Under the rules of jihad (holy war)
proclaimed against Israel by Moslem leaders from 3^- countries in October of
1968, those Arabs who fall in battle are accorded the reverence of prophets
and go straight to paradise. ^°
While international law does not encourage the use of violence in the
settlement of disputes, it must be recognized that the Palestinian refugees
have lost their lands, their homes, and their personal possessions. They
have been denied the basic right of human dignity. For 21 years, they have
been nourished on promises and false hopes . The United Nations and the Arab
states on whom they have long counted for help have proved to be impotent
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to obtain for then the justice which they feel is long overdue. Under the
circumstances, it is difficult to condemn them for resorting to coercive
measures of self-help. The refugees' tragic situation has "been well summed
up "by the Commissioner- General of UNRWA:
Psychologically, the refugees are confronted constantly with
the physical dangers and tensions resulting from hostilities
across the cease-fire lines, eruptions of violence in the
occupied areas, and retaliatory raids on the ground and in
the air. They feel the frustrations and fears of measures
taken for security reasons, such as curfews, interrogations,
detentions and demolition of buildings . Uncertainty about
the future which has hung over their heads for twenty- one
years, continues. They wonder when, if ever, they may
realize the hopes which the United Nations has extended to
them— hopes to return to their places of residence before •
June I967, hopes for repatriation to their original homes
or compensation for those choosing not to return, and
hopes for "a just settlement of the refugee problem", as
part of the peaceful settlement envisioned by the Security
Council Resolution of November 1967. °
c. Organizations Comprising the Resistance Movement
There are several separate fedayeen organizations that together comprise
the Palestine resistance movement. Of these, Al Fatah is the most prominent
and the largest. Al Fatah is the political bureau of the Palestine Libera-
tion Movement. The military wing of the organization is known as "Al Assifa "
(The storm) . There are several camps in Jordan where Al Assifa recruits are
trained. The period of training is three months. While in training, the
recruits receive $28.00 per month. When they become full fledged commandos,
their pay goes up to $56.00 per month.
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The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is the most
extreme of the fed.ayeen organizations. The PFLP has taken credit for such
spectacular activities as the hijacking of an El Al airliner, the shooting
up of two others, the "bombing of the Tel Aviv central bus station and a
121Jerusalem supermarket, and the blowing up of the Aramco pipeline. Unlike
Al Fatah
,
the Popular Front, pays its personnel no salary. Some money is
available to support a guerrilla's family, but the guerrilla himself receives
122
only his food, a blanket, and a weapon.
The total number of commandos in the resistance movement is secret.
However, it is estimated that there are about 15,000 in Jordan, about 2,000
123
in Syria, and about 2,000 in Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
Many Palestinians have become educated and have been living in Arab
states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Lebanon, where they are
doing well as engineers, financiers, professors, lawyers, and businessmen.
It is these men who have put together the new fedayeen movement and who have
emerged as the new leaders of the Palestinian Arabs. Yaser Arafat, the leader
of As Fatah is a Palestinian educated in Cairo, who worked as an engineer
in Kuwait. Dr. George Habash, the head of PFLP is a Palestinian who became
12k
a medical doctor in Lebanon.
d. Objectives and Goals of the Resistance Movement
One of the most significant achievements of Al Fatah has been its con-
structive and realistic analysis and statement of the objectives and goals of
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the resistance movement. In the past, Arab objectives were stated in vague
and highly inflammatory terms, such as threats to "drive the Jews into the
sea." Al Fatah constantly stresses that its objective is limited to the
destruction of the political structure of the state of Israel and not the
125Jews living there. ' In a pamphlet published by Al Fatah , it is stated
that:
"Al Fatah" has and will always insist that the military wing
"Al Assifa", is not operating against any particular faith.
Palestine has consisted for centuries of Arabs belonging to
the Moslem, Christian, Jewish and other faiths. Harmony has
always prevailed between these groups in Palestine.
"Al Fatah" does NOT intend to "push the Jews into the sea."
Its resistance and struggle remain solely against the malig-
nant Zionist regime which has usurped, pillaged, expelled,
and terrorized Palestine's native Arabic speaking inhabitants
. .
.-^o
Addressing himself to the goals of the resistance movement, Yasir Arafat
has stated:
The fight is against Zionism as a political, land- grabbing
movement and not against the Jewish people . In fact we want
to liberate not only ourselves from Zionism but also the
Jews who are being used by this malignant doctrine as cannon
fodder for a racist rule and international monopolies
.
Those Jews who want to live in peace with the Arabs in a
liberated Palestine will be accepted as citizens with full
rights . Unlimited numbers of Jews can live in Palestine
on equal terms, without religious or legal discrimination.
Towards the Jews, we will show the utmost generosity. We
are not anti-Jewish revolutionaries because our enemies are
not the Jews; we are not anti-Semitic because we are Semites.
We are a militant liberation movement in the fullest sense
of the expression. -^'
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Arafat has also stated:
. . .
Our aim is to bring an end to the concept of a Jewish
Zionist state, a racist expansionist state. Our aim is to
destroy this state, this concept—hut not its people. We
want a democratic Palestinian state. We will not force
anyone out who is willing to live under the banner of this
state as a loyal Palestinian. It does not matter whether
he is Christian, Moslem, or Jew. ^ "
From the foregoing, it is clear that the official objectives or goal
of the resistance movement is the creation of a bi- national state, which
would foster and promote inclusive values for all its inhabitants rather
than the exclusive values of a chosen few.
e. Strategy of the Resistance Movement
With no hope of defeating the Israelis themselves, the fedayeen aim to
provoke Israel into taking over more and more Arab territories until it
129finally chokes on a glut of Arabs within its borders. The greater the
number of Arabs within territories occupied by Israel and the more acreage
that must be defended, the weaker will be Israel's position and the greater
will be the cost to. Israel from acts of subversion and terrorism in the part
of Arabs within the occupied areas. In addition, according to Arafat, "the
very process of Israeli expansion will extend the war of liberation into all
the countries bordering on the occupied territories, and they will take up
the struggle in defense of their own existence." 3
The fedayeen leaders realize that their struggle may take some time.
They talk of fighting for 20, 30 or even 50 years. ' That they fuiiy
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intend to continue the struggle, even if it takes many years, is clearly
demonstrated by the fact that Al Fatah has set up training camps where
Palestinian youth aged 8 to lh receive military, political, and athletic
132
training after school hours as members of Al Ashbal (lion cubs),,
In addition to the stated aim of provoking Israel into taking more and
more Arab territory, the commando activities are very important for the pur-
pose of rallying the Palestinian Arabs behind their cause. As one fedayeen
leader put it: 'The masses can be mobilized in Palestine only around the
:es i
13**
133issue of fighting . . .." Explaining why the PFLP concentrate on sabo-
tage and attacks of a spectacular nature, Dr. Habash has stated:
Frankly, we need the shock value, not for personal publicity
but for the whole Palestine cause . We had to shock both an
indifferent would and a demoralized Palestine nation. We
must make it clear to our own people and all the world that
there can be no political solution short of a return to
Palestine.
So that the Palestinian people will not be forgotten and to gain world-
wide support for their cause, one of the basic strategies of the movement is
stated by Al Fatah to be the creation of "an awareness of the Palestinian
problem on the regional, national and international levels." ^5
With the ever increasing effectiveness of the commando operations, the
fedayeen hope that the heightening tension and instability within Israel may
serve to halt immigration and even give an impetus to Jewish emmigration from
Israel. They hope that the commando raids will have the effect of curtailing
foreign investment in Israel, will burden the Israeli budget with high defense
costs, and will ultimately paralyze Israel's economic growth. ^
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TV RECOGNITION OF PALESTINE RESISTANCE
FORCES AS
1
' Sl COMBATANTS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF
THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF PRISONERS
OF WAR
A. Regulations Governing the Conduct
of
Modern Warfare
The conduct of modem warfare is regulated
by various rules and
regulations, known as the laws of war,
which set forth basic principles that
have been acknowledged a, binding
by a majority of civilized states. VSI The
primary sources of the laws of war are
the customs or usages of war generally
accepted by the nations of the world and
treaties, especially multilateral
treaties, such as the Hague Convention
of l899 and 1907 and the Geneva
Con-
ventions of 1929 and «*9. ^ » * particular
treaty or clause of a treaty
setting forth rules governing the conduct
of warfare is declaratory of
international customary law or general
principles of law, belligerents are
bound to comply with these obligations
even if they have not formally adhered
vag
to the treaty. -^
The purpose of the laws of war is
to make the conduct of ar^ed hostili-
ties as humanitarian as possible, giving
consideration to the needs of
military necessity. As a practicable
matter, the efficacy of the nta
governing the conduct of warfare depend
in large part on the honor and con-
science of the belligerents. Unfortunately,
as the Nuremburg and Tokyo war
crimes trails show, this is not a very
reliable means of ensuring adherence
to the lavs of war.
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The laws of war are applicable irregardless of whether the resort to
coercion is regarded as permissible or impermissible, just or unjust, or
legal or illegal. 1^0 The reasons for this are obvious. If a belligerent
was not bound by the laws of war, his opponent would certainly refuse to
abide by them, thus completely frustrating the purpose of the rules
.
Another reason why justness or legality cannot be permitted to determine the
applicability of the laws of war is that decisions as to the justice or
legality of a particular cause often depend on the perspective from which
the conflict is viewed. Obviously, the participants in the hostilities
would have diverging views as to which side is in the right and so would
not be very likely to accept the findings of any outside decision-makers.
Among the various treaties regulating the conduct of war, one that is
of particular significance in the case of the Palestine resistance movement
is the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 19^9 • If this convention is
not applicable, then all resistance forces who engage in military acts such
as the killing or wounding of enemies, or the destruction of enemy property,
upon capture, could be treated as criminal offenders and be punished accord-
ingly. On the other hand, if the Convention does apply, such forces would be
entitled to all of the protections contained therein that are applicable to
those in a prisoner of war status.
B. Claims of the Participants Concerning the Applicability
of the Prisoners of War Convention
In defining the categories of persons who should be considered prisoners
of war, Article k of the Prisoners of War Convention provides:
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A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have
fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict,
as well as militias or volunteer corps forming part of such
armed forces
.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied,
provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such
organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible
for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war.
11+2
• • • •
The Zionists consider the fedayeen to be terrorists and murderers. They
maintain that the Palestinians in the ranks of the fedayeen are once again
simply being exploited by the neighboring Arab states for their own political
purposes .1^3 In an Israeli government publication, it is stated that:
The immediate purpose of the Arab terrorist organizations and
their backers in the Arab capitals is- -now as before the Six-
Day War- -to weaken Israel and undermine Israel morale, keeping
tensions and para-warfare alive in the Middle East, while the
Arab States and their military establishments prepare to renew
their total attack. 1^
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The official Israeli position on the prisoners of war question is
indicated in a pamphlet published by the Zionist Organization of America:
Addressing a British Labor Party branch in Jerusalem, Foreign
Minister Abba Eban stated on August 5 £}S&§] that the Fatah
terrorist organization was outside the Jurisdiction of international
law and could not clam _/sic7 its protection. "There is something
strange," he said, "in an Arab state invoking U.N.'s protection for
a terror group trained and organized to murder the citizens of a
neighboring state. A normal country cannot ask the protection of
courts for 'organized gangs of sworn murderers ' ."-^A
From Eban's statement, it is clear that Israel has no intention of
abiding by the Prisoners of War Convention even in those cases where the four
conditions set forth in Article k of the Convention have been complied with.
Some of the fedayeen attacks are carried out against targets in Israel
or deep within occupied areas. In such cases, if the commandos are to have
any real chance of completing their mission and escaping, they probably
cannot comply with the requirements of the Convention calling for the having
of a fixed distinctive sign that is recognizable at a distance, and the open
carrying of arms. However, in the bulk of the fedayeen attacks, which are
carried out against targets in the occupied areas near the Jordan River, the
same considerations do not apply. In carrying out such attacks, the fedayeen
can and probably do usually wear uniforms and carry weapons openly. ^°
Numerous Arab claims have been made that Israel has violated the
Prisoners of War Convention in a number of instances by such acts as the
killing of commandos after, their capture, by torturing those that they do
take prisoner, and by subjecting the prisoners to criminal trials . '
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C. Appraisal and Recommendations
During World War II, partisan or guerrilla units conducted extensive
operations against the enemy in France, Norway, the Soviet Union, Malaya,
Burma, the Philippines, and in many other areas occupied by the Axis powers.
Virtually all of these resistance movements operated with the full approval
of their legitimate sovereign. Most of them received material support
through air drops of weapons, munitions, medical supplies, food, and even
leaders. The activities of these resistance forces, which contributed in no
small measure to the ultimate victory of the Allies, were denounced as
illegal by the Axis powers, who imposed drastic penalties on those that they
captured .1^°
The continued Axis claims as to the illegal nature of the partisan
activities and the harsh punishments (usually shooting without any intervening
trial) meted out to members of the resistance forces resulted in a reappraisal
of rules relating to this type of v/arfare following the conclusion of World
War II. As a result, in Article k of the Prisoners of War Convention of
19^9, it is provided that resistance forces operating in or outside of their
own territories, even if this territory is occupied, are entitled to prisoner
of war status if they meet the four specified minimum conditions
.
The first condition set forth in Article h requires that the resistance
forces be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates. Compliance
with this requirement causes resistance forces no real difficulties as a
guerrilla band would, of necessity, have to have a leader if it is to operate
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effectively. There is no requirement that the commander be commissioned or
appointed "by the party vhose cause he serves. His leadership could be simply
asserted and acknowledged by his subordinates, or he could be elected by his
troops. What is required is simply that the commander exercise sufficient
authority to ensure that his men comply with the laws of war. ^°
The condition requiring that operations be conducted in accordance with
the laws and customs of war appears to be a fair and reasonable requirement.
Guerrilla bands who do not themselves observe the rules of war should not
expect the benefits and protection of such rules in the event that they fall
into enemy hands
.
The other two conditions, requiring resistance forces to have a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance and' to carry arms openly can not
always be easily complied with by guerrilla forces. The idea behind these
provisions is to prevent guerrillas from being able to hide among the
civilian inhabitants, strike, and then blend back among the civilians. The
requirement for a distinctive sign is usually fulfilled by the wearing of a
military uniform that makes one clearly distinguishable from the general popu-
lation. Where, because of poverty, a sudden emergency, or other reasons,
a uniform is not worn, the requirement can be met by the wearing of a distinc-
tive sign that cannot be quickly assumed or removed. This could be accomplish-
ed, for example, by sewing the sign to the clothing. Arms must be carried
openly, that is, they must not be concealed about the person and may not be
hidden on the approach of the enemy. -*-5°
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These provisions are somewhat unrealistic so far as guerrilla operations
are concerned, since typical guerrilla tactics call for the use of as much
stealth as possible to avoid detection up until the time the attack takes
place. Once the attack has been attempted or completed, the survival of
the guerrillas often depends on their ability to disappear in the face of
pursuit
.
In the old days, soldiers frequently wore very distinctive uniforms with
brilliant colors. However, modern combat uniforms are usually designed so as
to blend into the environment and make the wearer as inconspicuous as
possible. Since the insignia and uniforms worn by today's combat forces
offers little protection against surprise, the rationality of the requirement
for a fixed distinctive sign is open to serious doubt. -*-51 The rationality
of the requirement that arms be carried openly is also subject to serious
question. Many members of regular armed forces carry only a sidearm or some
other weapon that could be considered to be concealed, or no weapon at all.
However, the fact that they are not carrying weapons openly would not prevent
these regular forces from being entitled to prisoner of war status upon
capture
It might be claimed that if the provisions calling for a distinctive
sign and the open carrying of weapons were eliminated, this would seriously
hinder the occupant in suppressing violent resistance to the occupation by
removing a deterrent to guerrilla warfare . However, this is not necessarily
true. Past experience during World War II has shown that despite the common
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practice of summarily executing captured guerrillas, this denial of
prisoner of war status was not a very effective countermeasure against such
activity. This suggests that the elimination of these requirements would
not significantly affect the level or nature of resistance activities . For
those operations where a uniform and the open carrying of arms would be a
handicap, as is the current practice, they would not be utilized. On the
other hand, in the case of attacks in areas where camouflaged uniforms and
the type of arms that are carried openly are of assistance to the guerrillas,
they could be expected, just as they do now, to make use of them. In other
words, the elimination of these requirements would probably have little signi-
ficant effect on the tactics, methods of operation, types of clothing or
uniforms, and types of arms employed or used by resistance forces.
In view of the basic principal that there should be a minimum of
unnecessary destruction of values, it is considered by this writer that there
should be a re- evaluation of the provisions of Article k of the Prisoners of
War Convention with a view towards the elimination of the requirement that
resistance forces have a distinctive sign and carry weapons openly to be
entitled to prisoner of war status
.
Turning to the current situation in the Middle East, it would appear
that the same considerations mentioned above would prevail and that, in the
interests of humanity, Israel should accord prisoner of war status to all
captured resistance forces that are commanded by a leader and who have not
violated any of the laws or customs of war. However, it is recognized that

59
Israel has no legal obligation to expand the categories of persons entitled
to the protection of the Convention. At a minimum though, Israel is legally
obligated to accord prisoner of war status to those members of the resistance
forces who do comply with the four requirements.
On June 14, 1967, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolu-
tion in which it was indicated that the obligations of the 19^9 Geneva
Prisoners of War Convention should be complied with by the parties involved
in the conflict .152 However, it could be argued that this recommendation was
only concerned with those persons who had been taken prisoner during the con-
flict that had just ended and so is not addressed to the resistance situation,
Since it appears that Israel does not consider any of the resistance
forces to be covered by the Prisoners of War Convention, the United Nations
should adopt a resolution that clearly calls upon Israel to apply the pro-
visions of the Convention in the case of resistance forces who are captured
and who have complied with the four requirements of Article k.
Whether or not Israel would comply with such a resolution is, of course,
an open question. However, the fact that other resolutions have not been
fully complied with does not justify a failure to act . Israeli leaders
realize that repressive measures merely harden the determination of their
opponents. For this reason, death sentences have not been imposed against
any captured resistance forces .153 The failure to accord prisoner of war
status serves no real military purpose . Instead, the trials of captured
guerrillas simply help to establish them as martyrs and heros in the Arab
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world. While the formality of a trial and the imposition of a prison
sentence may help to satisfy the desires of many Israeli citizens for
punishment of the guerrillas, this procedure is actually against Israeli
long term interests . Accordingly, the moral force of a recommendation of
the United Nations Security Council that the Convention be complied with
might he sufficient to shift the attitude of the Israeli government on this
matter
.
V. LEGALITY OF RESISTANCE TOWARDS
A BELLIGERENT OCCUPANT
A. Obligations and Duties of the Inhabitants
and the Occupant
From ancient times, up to the nineteenth century, a belligerent occupant
was usually considered to be the absolute owner of the occupied lands. He
could treat the occupied regions and the inhabitants as he saw fit. He could
devastate the land and appropriate all public and private property. He could
kill the inhabitants, enslave them, hold them for ransom, or even make them
fight in his own army against their former sovereign. So long as belligerent
occupation was viewed as being tantamount to conquest, there was no question
but that the people owed allegiance to the occupant to the same extent as
they had owed it to their former sovereign. However, as the view became more
prevalent that a displaced sovereign retained sovereignty over his lands,
ideas about the duties of allegiance of the people changed. Since the Hague
Conference of l899> there has been general agreement that the inhabitants do
not ov/e allegiance to the occupant. *"
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While the inhabitants do not owe allegiance to the occupant, they do,
nevertheless, owe the occupant such obedience as may "be required to ensure
the security of the occupant's forces, to enable the occupant to establish
lav/ and order, and to enable the occupant to properly administer the
occupied territory. Inhabitants who commit offenses that violate these
obligations may be punished by the occupying power. *55 Of course, those
members of organized resistance forces who are entitled to the status of
lawful combatants under Article h of the Prisoners of War Convention, may
not be punished for acts of resistance against the occupant but must instead
be treated as prisoners of war.
While the inhabitants have certain obligations towards the occupant,
or at least the occupant has the right to punish the inhabitants for various
infractions, the inhabitants may, at the same time, claim certain obligations
on the part of the occupant. The inhabitants are entitled to continue to
go about their day-to-day lives as normally as possible, under the circum-
stances . They are entitled to respect for their well-being and for their
property, religious, and various other rights. In general, it may be said
that, consistent with the requirements of military necessity, they are en-
titled to a minimum of depravation or destruction of values that are material
to them.
The primary source for ascertaining the minimum community policies that
are applicable to the inhabitant- occupant relationship is the Geneva Civilians
Convention of 19^9. ^ In drafting this Convention, its authors aimed to
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prevent the reoccurrence of atrocities against civilian inhabitants of
occupied territories, such as were committed by the Nazis and the Japanese
during World War II.
All of the states involved in the June 19^7 hostilities, are parties
to the Civilians Convention and so are bound by its terms . -*-57 rpne conven-
tion is applicable in the case of any armed conflict, whether or not there
has been a declaration of war, and is applicable even if a state of war is
not recognized by one or more of the states involved . -*-5° Alj_ -5^ a number
of specified key articles of the Convention cease to be operative one year
after the general close of military operations . -*-59 However, an armistice
agreement only provides for a temporary cessation of hostilities and does
not put an end to a condition of war between the belligerents. ±"0 rj>ne day-
to-day newspaper accounts of Israeli raids and strikes against Egyptian,
Syrian, and Jordanian positions and their countering attacks against Israeli
positions, not to mention the continuing resistance attacks within Israel and
the occupied areas furnishes substantial evidence that the general military
operations have not been brought to a close
. In view of the humanitarian
objectives of the Civilians Convention, it is clear that any doubts resulting
from the ambiguity of the term "close of military operations" should be re-
solved in favor of the continued applicability of all portions of the
Convention to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since the June 1967 war,
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Israel's purported annexation of Jordanian Jerusalem is of no effect
so far as the applicability of the Civilians Convention is concerned. The
obligations of an occupant cannot be avoided by the premature and illegal
annexation of occupied territory.lol Annexation of conquered enemy terri-
tory, whether of the whole or a part, cannot effectively transfer title until
after a clearly established conquest and, as long as war continues, conquest
is not clearly established. 162 That the war between Israel and Jordan has
not been concluded is abundantly clear. In a United nations General Assembly
resolution passed on June 17, 19^7, the measures taken by Israel in an attempt
to alter the status of Jerusalem were declared to be invalid .-L°3 jn the
Civilians Convention, it is provided that:
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be
deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits
of the present Convention ... by any annexation by the latter of
the whole or part of the occupied territory .-*-" *
1. Claims Concerning the Conduct of the
Israeli Occupation of Arab Lands
Since the close of the June !S6j, hostilities, innumerable allegations
have been made claiming that Israel has consistently committed serious viola-
tions of the Civilians Convention in the conduct -of the occupation of Arab
lands. Before proceeding to examine some of these claims, it would be well
to point out that no effort has been made to establish the veracity of each
of the various claims. Some, no doubt, are true. Others may contain
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little or no truth. However, those claims that are well documented do tend
to show that there have "been a number of serious breaches of several articles
of the Civilians Convention.
a. Claims Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners and Detainees
Article 27 of the Civilians Convention provides:
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect
for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their re-
ligious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs.
They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be pro-
tected especially against all acts of violence or threats there-
of and against insults and public curiosity.
• • * •
Article 31 of the Civilians Convention provides
:
No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected
persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from
third parties
.
Article 37 of the Civilians Convention provides:
Protected persons who are confined pending proceedings or serving
a sentence involving loss of liberty, shall during their confinement
be humanely treated
.
• • • •
In an article published in the Jerusalem Post on March 31* 1968, and
quoted in a Zionist publication, it is stated in part:
When arrested he Ja Fatah member/ is often joined by the rest of
his band, for he often discloses their hiding places.
Before they cross over from TransJordan, the Fatah members are
told that when they are sure that they are surrounded, they
should not resist, that they may surrender. They know that
they will be safe in prison, they also know that there is no
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death penalty in Israel, that the prisons here, compared to
the many they have been to, are relatively comfortable. 16
5
From this, it would seem that those who are detained or imprisoned by
Israeli authorities are treated with kindness and consideration. Without
the necessity of the use of force or coercion, they willingly give the
Israeli authorities information that may serve to condemn other fellow
members of their resistance organization.
Contrasted with this report is the eyewitness account of a reporter who
was at an Israeli interrogation center where suspected "terrorists" captured
during the battle for Karamah were being questioned. The reporter states:
"Captured terrorists must expect torture (Arab police use it on their own
people), but it was horrible to hear." 1"° While these suspected "terrorists"
had been apprehended during a raid into unoccupied Jordan, they nevertheless
were entitled to the protection of the Civilians Convention under the pro-
visions of the first paragraph of Article h, which provides:
Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals
.
It is a well publicized fact that fedayeen who participate in commando
attacks in Israel or in the occupied areas sustain a very high casualty
rate. 1"' Obviously, it takes a dedicated and courageous sort of individual
to be willing to participate in such activities . It is difficult to believe
that, upon capture, this type of person would volunteer information that is
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damaging to his fellow fedayeen and to his cause without the prior applica-
tion of some very severe mental and physical forms of coercion. Reports of
the use of such measures are not lacking. Many accounts have been given "by
former prisoners or internees, who have "been released or who have escaped,
of various types of intimidation and torture used "by the Israelis to extract
information from them. -^o While many of the reports may "be highly exaggerated
or contain some untruths, with so many accounts of torture rendered "by so
many different persons, it is apparent that there must be some substance
behind the allegations of inhuman treatment accorded to internees and prisoners
by the Israelis
.
While some might find it difficult to believe that the Israelis would
resort to such behavior towards their fellow man, there are many other
examples of cruelty towards their Arab opponents that might be cited . One
example that clearly shows their cruel and callous attitude towards the Arabs
is the "boots incident." During the June I967 hostilities, many Arab soldiers
were seen making their way across the Sinai desert without any boots or shoes.
As one typical report put it: "Egyptian soldiers had discarded their shoes
in their haste to retreat, presumably in the belief that the boots impeded
progress in the soft sand." 1"° That many Egyptian soldiers did have to
make their way across the desert without boots is undoubtedly true. However,
it is just as clear that no one who has lived all his life in the Middle East,
where so much of the land consists of desert, would think of trying to walk
through the Sinai desert bare footed under a broiling summer sun. Upon
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capturing the unfortunate Arabs, instead of going to the trouble of trans-
porting them to prisoner of war camps, the Israelis simply took away their
boots and sent them on their way, through the fiery desert sands, towards
the Suez Canal. No doubt, many of those set out across the desert in this
fashion did not make it to the Canal. Photographs of some of those that did
make it to the Canal, with their feet bandaged in an attempt to protect them
from the intense heat of the desert sands, clearly reflect the extreme
suffering and pain brought about by their trip through the desert without
shoes or boots .170
b . Claims Concerning the Forcible Transfer and Deporation
of Inhabitants and the Transfer of the Occupant's
Civilian Population Into the Occupied Territory
The first paragraph of Article 1+9 of the Civilians Convention provides:
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deporations of pro-
tected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying
Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited,
regardless of their motive.
Mention has previously been made of Israeli efforts during and immediate-
ly after the June 19&7, hostilities, to induce and assist the Palestinian
refugees and residents to leave the occupied areas. In addition to these
claims, there have been numerous claims made that Israel has continued to
use coercive methods to induce protected persons to leave the occupied areas
and that, in some cases, protected persons have been forcibly deported. If-*-
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No claims have been made that Israel has transferred or deported pro-
tected persons to Israel. Rather, the deportations and transfers have been
to states that are clearly identified with and are friendly towards the pro-
tected persons involved. In the case of those protected persons transferred
from the west bank to the east bank of the Jordan River, it could be argued
that they have not been transferred or deported to "any other country" since
the West Bank is still legally part of Jordan. The same argument could also
be used in the case of those who are transferred or deported from the Sinai
Peninsula or the Gaza Strip to Egypt. However, in interpreting the first
paragraph of Article kS, it must be kept in mind that the purpose of the
drafters of this Article was to prevent a reoccurrence of the well-known
Nazi practice of deporting persons from occupied areas to Germany for use as
forced laborers, for other inhumane purposes, and to clear areas for settle-
ment by "more desirable" persons. While the drafters may not have envisioned
a situation such as has developed in the Middle East, it is clear that their
intent was to prohibit all transfers of the population of occupied areas to
any other places except for genuine security reasons, which is provided for in
the second paragraph of Article kS . To ensure that these provisions are not
used as a simple pretext for evacuating occupants for reasons other than
security, it is provided that the Protecting Power must transfer the occu-
pants back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area have ceased.
That the drafters of the Civilians Convention intended to prohibit trans-
fers for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the occupant's
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citizens in the occupied area is clear from a reading of the concluding
paragraph of Article h$ } which provides: "The Occupying Power shall not
deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory-
it occupies."
There have been numerous accounts in newspapers and periodicals which
indicate that Israel is establishing settlements of civilians in the occupied
areas . One of the most recent accounts reported the inauguration of Rosh
Tsurin on the west bank of the Jordan River. Reportedly, Arabs who had tilled
the land there since 19^8, were evacuated and the settlement was taken over
by members of the religious kibbutz movement. It was also reported that
earlier this year, members of the same kibbutz movement had set up the near-
by Kfar Etzion settlement, also in the occupied' part of Jordan. '
Clearly, the settlement of Israeli citizens in the occupied areas is
a flagrant violation of Article k-9 . The claim has been made that "these are
not ordinary settlements but military outposts." ^73 However, the fact that
the settlements may play a military role cannot be used to justify violations
of this clear precise and provision prohibiting the settlement of civilians
in occupied areas . That protected persons are being displaced in order to
make room for Israeli settlers makes the flaunting of this provision




c. Claims Concerning Reprisals and Collective Punishments
The first and last paragraphs of Article 33 3f the Civilians Convention
provide:
No protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has
not personally committed . Collective penalties and likewise all
measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.
Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.
It is a veil- known fact that Israel's official policy is to severely
punish alleged "collaborators" with the fedayeen by bloving up their homes.
Defending this controversial policy, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan
stated at a press conference that the destruction of the homes (about 250
as of June 22, 19^9) has discouraged collaboration with terrorists .^7^
Allegations have also been made that various other punishments have been
imposed on the inhabitants of the occupied areas, including such measures as
extended curfews, mass arrests and searches, detention without the placing
of charges, intensive interrogations, and the confiscation of property .175
Needless to say, measures such as these are clearly prohibited by Article 33 •
d. Claims Concerning Looting, Pillage, and Destruction of Property
Article 53 of the Civilians Convention Provides:
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property
belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the
State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative
organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is
rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.




In addition to the homes previously mentioned that were destroyed as
reprisals for alleged collaboration with fedayeen
,
it is a veil publicized
fact that the Israelis have bulldozed Arab homes to create a parking lot and
a broad plaza at the Wailing Wall in occupied Jerusalem. They have also made
extensive excavations to uncover more of the wall. When the excavations
reached the 5|- story home that happened to be the childhood home of Yasser
Arafat, the leader of Al Fatah
, inch thick cracks appeared in its walls,
conveniently enabling the Israelis to label the building as dangerous to
public safety, thereby allowing this building, along with all others in the
way of the excavations, to be demolished. ^-76
While, in some areas, the destruction of homes and even complete villages
could be attributed to military operations, there have been numerous reports
of widespread destruction not related to military activities . In a report of
the Secretary- General of the United Nations (hereinafter referred to as the
"Report of the Secretary- General"), based upon the observations of Nils- Goran
Gussing, his personal representative, it is indicated that at Beit Awa, in
the Hebron area, out of some 400 houses, more than 90 per cent were completely
demolished and the remaining homes were partly damaged. ^«« The story of what
happened at Beit Awa, is summarized as follows:
The Special Representative visited Beit Awa on 11 August. The
Arab Mukhtar stated that Israel troops entered the village on
11 June at 5^30 a.m. Trie inhabitants were then asked to take
two loaves of bread and to go to the hills surrounding the
village. At 7*30 a.m. the Israel troops started to demolish
the houses with dynamite and bulldozers
. Groves around the
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village were burnt. The belongings of the inhabitants were
also burnt since they were unable to take them along. The
population stayed in the hills for a week. They were then
authorized to return by the military governor. Out of the
original population of 2,500, some 300 had left for other areas. -1-'"
An Israeli military officer informed the Special Representative that a
decision had been made by the government to rebuild the village. '" This,
in effect, admitted that the destruction had been wrongful. The Special
Representative also reported that another village in the area, Beit Mersim,
which had had a population of approximately 500, was completely destroyed. -^°
Many other Arab villages such as Zeita, Beit Nuba, and Yalu, have also been
reported as having been destroyed by the Israelis after the end of hostilities
in June of 1967. l81
In addition to the destruction of homes and villages, the Israelis have
also resorted to the systematic confiscation of real property. In the Hebron
area, for example, property of inhabitants who had left the area was seized
under the authority of the Absentees' Property Law of 1950, the same law that
had been used by the Israeli government to deprive thousands of Arabs of
their property in Israel. In the Report in the Occupied Territories, the
confiscation is described as follows:
The Israeli custodian of absentees' property had seized the
houses of those who were away since the houses were empty.
However, in some cases, the inhabitants were only temporarily
away on a visit to Amman. In other cases, when a relative of
the owner had been present but not the owner himself, the
property had still been considered as absentee property by
the Israel authorities . 1"2
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Not only is property of absent Arabs confiscated, "but homes are also
seized and the Arabs evicted on various pretexts. For example, on June 25,
1969, Israeli authorities seized a number of buildings, including a Moslem
school and the Mahkama, a historic Moslem court and mosque, in the Old City
of Jerusalem, along the route used by visitors to the Wailing Wall. The
17 evicted Arab families, totaling 88 people, were told to find new quarters
on their own. However, after the eviction became a public issue, city
officials agreed to pay a year's rent to each of the families. Most of the
families accepted the offer and moved to new quarters in Silwan and Abu,
outside the Old City of Jerusalem. A cafe owner and three families who re-
fused to accept the Israeli order were evicted by soldiers. The buildings
thus seized were to be used to billet Israeli soldiers to "ensure the
safety" of visitors to the Wailing Wall. ^"3
Numerous claims have also been made that the Israelis have engaged in
wholesale looting and pillage of Arab holy places, homes, shops, and other
buildings in the occupied areas . ^* The Syrian village of Kuneitra was one
village, for example, that suffered extensive pillage or looting. In the
Report on the Occupied Areas, it is stated that:
Although reports from Israeli sources indicate that Kuneitra was
taken without fighting, the Special Representative observed all
over the city that nearly every shop and every house seemed to
have been broken into and looted. A visit to one apartment
building confirmed the thoroughness with which the looting had
been done, and showed that in some cases dwellings had been
set on fire after looting had occurred. IS5
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While Israeli spokesman did not deny the looting in Kuneitra, they did
try to convey the impression that the looting might have been done "by Syrian
troops . However, on the strength of reports received from different sources,
the Special Representative "felt reasonably sure that the responsibility for
this extensive looting of the town of Kuneitra lay to a great extent with
the Israeli forces . . . ."loo
Even hospitals and schools were not immune. During his visit to the
hospital at Oalqiliya, the Assistant to the Special Representative was
informed by the doctor in charge that the "X-ray machine, the operating
table, overhead lights, and other equipment in the operating theatre, as
well as stocks of hospital linen had disappeared ,"1°7 In the most recent
report of the Commissioner- General of UIIRWA, it is stated that:
In the Gaza Strip, during and immediately after the hostilities,
ninety of the Agency's 100 schools were damaged and looted in
varying degrees to the extent of an estimated $220,000 in value. -^°°
B. Claims Concerning the Right of Palestinians to
Resort to Individual and Collective
Self- Defense
As has previously been pointed out, the resistance of Palestinians to
the takeover of their lands by the Zionists is not a recent phenomenon. It
started long before the establishment of the "Jewish" State of Israel in
19^8, which made the Palestinians aliens in their own country. Their re-
sistance has not always been well organized and articulate. At times, the
resistance movements have received assistance and direction from Arab states
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on Israel's "borders. But always, Palestinians have been directly involved
in the coercive aspects of the movement. While the resistance movement has
received new emphasis and direction as an indirect result of the June 19^7
war, the factors that motivate the resistance of the Palestinian people re-
mains essentially the same. They have suffered expulsion from their lands
and homes, expropriation and destruction of their property, loss of their
national heritage, and they have been deprived of many other fundamental
human values, including the basic value of human dignity and self-respect.
To the Palestinians, the June 19&7 war and the subsequent Israeli
occupation of Arab lands is, in many ways, like the re- run of an old movie.
In their view, Israel launched the hostilities for the primary purpose of
furthering Zionist expansionist aims. Their hopes of 20 years had gone up in
smoke. Part of Jerusalem was annexed by Israel and the rest of the occupied
lands were treated as part of Israel. Once again, there was the expulsion,
the destruction and expropriation of homes and other property, and the
replacement of Arab villages with Zionist settlements. An increase in the
intensity of resistance activities was to be expected. This was met by
Israeli reprisals, which then led to Palestinian counter- reprisals.
In a world with constantly increasing expectations and demands for the
limitation and eventual elimination of international violence and coercion,
a very fundamental question arises as to whether or not the Palestinian
resistance activities constitutes lawful self-defense. In ascertaining the
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answer to this question, one of the primary sources that should "be consulted
is the four Geneva Conventions of 19^9 • None of these four conventions
condemns resistance movements. To the contrary, they each contain provisions
that afford various types of protection to those engaged in such activities.
Articles 13(2) of each of the conventions relating to the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces, and Article ^(2) of the Prisoners of War Convention all contain
identical language clearly extending coverage of these Conventions to members
of organized resistance movements who meet the four enumerated requirements
previously discussed. This amounts to an express admission that resistance
is a likely concomittant to occupation and that such resistance should not
be considered unlawful. Significantly, the protections of these Conventions
are to be provided irregardless of whether the resistance movement operates
in or outside the occupied territory. This indicates that the resistance
that is recognized as lawful includes not only that which takes place at the
time of initial occupation, but would also include long range resistance
movements conducted over an extended period of time. As has previously been
mentioned, even those resistance forces that do not meet the four requirements,
are afforded protection by the Civilians Convention.
There is some authority to the effect that even in the absence of these
Geneva Convention provisions, where an occupant has violated duties imposed
upon it by the laws of war then the inhabitants are released from any possible
duties of obedience and cannot be denied the right of self-defense. 190
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Intertwined in the question of legality of the Palestine resistance
movement is the issue of the justness of the cause for which the resistance
is waged. While the Geneva Conventions do not differentiate between resist-
ance movements waged for just or unjust causes, contemporary fundamental com-
munity policy does seek to restrict or prohibit the resort to coercion except
for certain purposes, such as to protect certain indispensable values and to
enforce certain community decisions.
The Judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal is a clear pronouncement of the
impermissability of aggressive war. The waging of aggressive war is also
clearly prohibited by the provision in the United Nations Charter that:
All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security, and justice, are not endangered.
All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations . 191
In Article 51 of the Charter, the right of self-defense is expressly
preserved
. However, the Charter does not contain any real guidelines to
assist a decision maker in reaching decisions in a coercive situation as to
which of the participants is guilty of unlawful coercion and which is acting
in justifiable self-defense. In analyzing the question of the lawfulness in
an on- going coercive situation such as has developed in the Middle East,
numerous factors must be taken into consideration. One very important
factor is that of priority in the exercise of substantial coercion. " In
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examining the question of priority, no one particular act should be considered
in isolation from the "broader context of the entire factual development of
the coercive situation. Thus, in considering questions concerning the Pales-
tine resistance movement, it would be highly inappropriate to simply examine
particular guerrilla attacks, the inauguration of the June 19&7 hostilities,
or any other single coercive development. Rather, an examination of the
question of priority must include a view of all of the relevant factual back-
ground commencing with the founding of the World Zionist Organization in
l897« Applying this principle, it will be recalled that it was the World
Zionist Organization that sponsored Zionist immigration to Israel, the system-
atic purchase of Arab lands, and the use of various measures to drive the
Arabs out of Palestine. It was the Zionists who were the first to use organ-
ized terrorism against the Arabs and the British in Palestine. It was the
Zionist reign of terror against the British that forced them to evacuate and
leave the Arabs to face the Zionist threats alone. In 19^8, all of the par-
ticipants in the hostilities claimed self-defense. In 195&, Israel clearly
attacked first, claiming self-defense. In 19&7, Israel again was the attacker,
and again claimed self-defense. Each time the Zionists have claimed self-
defense, it should be noted, they have reached out their hands for a generous
slice of Arab lands. If one considers these evenis, along with the entire
factual background of this conflict, the inescapable conclusion must be reached
that the Arabs have consistently, from the very first, reacted or responded to
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Zionist activities, "but cannot be said to have been the participant primarily
responsible for the initiation of the various coercive events.
Another very important factor to take into consideration in examining
questions relating to the legality of the coercive situation in the Middle
East is the exclusive or inclusive nature of the objectives of the partici-
pants. In today's world, with constantly increasing demands and
expectations for more widespread distribution and sharing of values, it
would appear that community policy should favor and consider most legitimate
the promotion of objectives that are of an inclusive rather than those of an
exclusive nature . What are relevant are the real, as distinguished from the
proclaimed objectives of each. In order to ascertain the nature of the
actual objectives of a participant, it is necessary to view the words, acts,
and effects of the acts of each participant in the context of the entire
development of the coercive situation. In the case of Israel, the demonstra-
ted Zionist objectives are of an unquestionably exclusive nature. It is clear
that values at stake are largely to be shared only by Jews, or more exactly,
Jews who are Zionists. In the case of the Palestinians, their objectives
manifest inclusivity in that they call for a widespread sharing of the values
involved irregardless of the religious or racial backgrounds of the members
of the community.
Whatever test is applied to the Zionist- Palestinian confrontation, the
conclusion is inescapable that the Palestinians are fighting for their lands,
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their property, their lives, and for the overriding conception of human
dignity. The further conclusion must also be reached that their resort to
coercion does contribute lawful self-defense.
C. Appraisal and Recommendations
The objectives of the Nazi and Japanese regimes during World War II
were blatantly unjust and illegal. Yet, so far as the victims of atrocities
committed in occupied areas were concerned, this was of small consolation.
Unfortunately, the world order system under which we live still has not pro-
gressed to the point where third- party decision-makers can make and enforce
rational judgments concerning the legality and permissibility of on- going
coercive situations such as is currently found in the Middle East.
Considering the diametrically opposed objectives of the participants
and the manner in which the entire situation is enmeshed in the political
"cold-war" between the world's major powers, it is not likely that there will
be an early end to the Israeli occupation of Arab lands . Pending the ultimate
settlement of the conflict, from a humanitarian standpoint, there is a very
pressing need for action to ensure implementation of the provisions of the
Civilians Convention in the occupied areas
.
As a first step towards accomplishing this goal, it is imperative that
a fact-finding mission be stationed in the Middle East by the United Nations.
The sole function of this mission should be to investigate any alleged
violations of the 19^-8 Geneva Convention in the occupied areas and to report
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their findings to the Secretary- General on a continuing "basis. These findings
should be released to the public by the Secretary- General as soon after re-
ceipt as possible. The purpose of such a fact-finding mission would be
threefold. First of all, by focusing public attention on particular viola-
tions, the unfavorable publicity and public reaction and, in many cases,
even the possibility of such a reaction, could well result in a much more
humanitarian approach on the part of the Israeli authorities. Some salient
illustrations of this are found in the Report on the Occupied Areas. For
example, when the Assistant to the Special Representative toured the hospital
at Qalquiliya and was informed that the operating room equipment had disap-
peared, Israeli authorities present immediately promised to provide the hos-
pital with a new operating theatre. ^ Assuming that the Israeli authorities
kept their word, the replacement of the equipment considerably lessens the
nature of the violation. More recently, as has previously been mentioned,
it was adverse publicity that resulted in the Israeli authorities offering
the payment of a years rent to Arabs in Jerusalem who were being forced to
move to other quarters . -^"^
A second purpose of the fact-finding mission would be to deter
occupation authorities from committing violations of the Geneva Conventions
.
If Israeli authorities are aware that their actions in the occupied areas
may be subjected to immediate examination by an impartial fact-finding mis-
sion, they may well hesitate to embark upon programs or to institute measures
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that contravene the Conventions, especially where their actions would tend
to provoke widespread public condemnation because of violations that deprive
inhabitants of basic human rights.
A third purpose to be served by the fact-finding mission would be to
ensure public understanding of and to gain public support for the imposition
of any sanctions that are called for in the event that the fact-finding mis-
sion finds that serious violations of the Conventions are taking place. Such
public enlightenment is of crucial importance since the use of sanctions can
be effective only to the degree that the necessity for their imposition is
understood and supported by the peoples of the world.
It is realized that there would be opposition on the part of Israel to
the creation of such a fact-finding mission. When the General Assembly passed
a resolution calling for such an inquiry in December of 1968, Israel indicated
that such a mission would not be admitted unless there was a comparable effort
to investigate the status of Jews in Arab countries, -^o This, the Arabs
refuse to permit,, for the obvious reason that they do not wish to be put in
the position of granting recognition to the Zionist "Jewish People" nation-
ality claims by allowing Israel to represent the interests of their citizens
who happen to adhere to the religion of Judaism. The condition imposed by
Israel might be somewhat justified if what was requested was a commission to
study the treatment of Arabs in Israel. But that is not what is called for.
Under the circumstances, the Israeli position is unsound and Israel would
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probably back down from this position if a fact-finding mission would
actually be dispatched to the scene. The Israeli authorities, as well as
those of all other states visited, did cooperate with the Secretary- General's
Special Representative, allowing him full freedom of movement and giving him
assistance in making transportation and other necessary arrangements for his
visits. -^' While Israel might complain loudly if a fact-finding mission
was actually sent to the Middle East, it probably would cooperate with the
mission rather than risk world-wide condemnation from a well- publicized re-
fusal to do so.
VI . COERCIVE MEASURES THAT MAY LEGITIMATELY BE EMPLOYED BY
OR HI COMBATTING RESISTANCE OR LIBERATION FORCES
Guerrilla warfare, with its hit and run tactics, raids, terrorism, and
sabotage, makes a mockery of the formality that is the hallmark of the
traditional military profession. Terrorism is one of the most powerful wea-
pons in the arsenal of the guerrilla leader. Wielded against his own people,
it helps to establish the necessary community support for the guerrillas.
Used against the enemy, it presents him with a considerable dilemma. In order
to deter such acts in the future and to maintain the morale of his people,
there is a tendency to use terror against terror. However, drastic measures
by the enemy to curb guerrilla attacks invariably increases the hostility of





In modern warfare, where there is the presence of an ideological
conflict, a struggle for values "beyond the immediate interests of the individ-
ual participants, especially if the values for which the struggle is waged
are deemed to be very fundamental, there is a tendency for rules designed to
limit destructivness to break down "because the end is thought to justify the
199
means. y ^ This seems to he what has happened in the Israeli- Palestinian
conflict. The fedayeen regularly resort to sabotage and terror attacks that
make no distinction between military and civilian targets, between men and
women, or between adults and children. The Isralies, on the other hand
resort to equally repressive counter-measures in their efforts to put a halt
to fedayeen attacks
.
In trying to justify their resort to extreme measures of coercion, "both
sides frequently claim that their actions constitute lawful reprisals. In
traditional international law, acts of reprisals are measures of retaliation,
that would ordinarily be illegal, which are resorted to by one belligerent
against another to convince the other that he must cease his violations of
the accepted rules of warfare . ^00 For reprisals to be justified, the il-
legal conduct of the enemy must first be proved and the action taken by the
201
retaliating participant must be a proper measure of reprisal.
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A. Claims as to Enemy Persons who are
Permissible Objects of Attack
The combatant members of enemy armed forces are, of course, permissible
targets of attack. A basic question arises though, when attacks are directed
against civilians. Traditionally, civilians who did not significantly par-
ticipate in the belligerent effort were not legitimate objects of attack.
However, in modern warfare, the distinction between combatants and the
civilian population has been whittled down both in theory and in fact by the
202demands of military necessity.
In the Middle East, numerous claims are being made by the participants
as to the use of violence against civilians. The Israelis have resorted, for
example to the shelling of refugee camps . On November 20, 1967, for example,
Israeli artillery shelled the Kama refugee camp, which was located two miles
east of the Jordan River, causing many casualties among its inhabitants.
Israel later claimed that the camp was being used as a staging area by Arab
commandos. ™3 Also, on an almost daily basis, newspapers report Israeli air
attacks on guerrilla bases and camps in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. In
August of 1969, Israeli planes bombed "Arab guerrilla positions" in Lebanon.
A Lebanese spokesman said that several people were seriously injured in the
raid, including a woman who later died of napalm burns. ^ While most of
these shellings and bombings are announced by Israeli authorities, and so
reported in American newspapers, as being against guerrilla camps and bases,







on the other hand, have made numerous attacks against
civilians "both within Israel and in the occupied areas. Among these attacks
were the explosion of a bomb in a supermarket in Israeli Jerusalem on
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February 21, 19&9, which killed two Israeli youths; the explosion of a
bomb in a cafeteria in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem on March 6, 1969>
which injured 29 students; ' and the explosion in August of 1969, °^ a
mine under a bus near El Hamma, in Israel, which killed two Israelis and
pop
wounded 12 others. ^ u Mines, usually of an indiscriminate effect, are
frequently used by the fedayeen . One type that they often use is a tiny
land mine, of Chinese manufacture, which they plant in streets and even in
schoolyards in Israel. -^ Explosive devices have even been found embedded
in watermelon in Israeli marketplaces . ^10 Probably the most notorious
attacks directed against Israel by the fedayeen were the attacks on El Al
aircraft . On December 26, 1968, Popular Front forces atte. eked an El Al
Boeing 707 with machine guns and gasoline bombs as it was preparing to take-
off for a flight from Athens to New York City, with kl passengers and a crew
of 10. One passenger, an Israeli engineer, was killed by bullets that
211penetrated the windows where he was sitting. On February 18, 1969,
Popular Front forces riddled another Israeli El Al airliner with machine gun
fire as it was taxing for a take-off at the Zurich airport. They also threw
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incendiary grenades at the plane, but they fell short. Two passengers
received gunshot wounds, four others were injured while escaping from the
plane, and one of the attackers was killed by an Israeli security guard
PIP
aboard the plane.
In addition to direct attacks against civilians, both sides have
attacked targets with the aim of causing widespread depravations among the
civilian population. For example, on May 31, 19&9, fedayeen blew up an oil
pipeline near the headwaters of the Jordan River for the apparent, though
unsuccessful, purpose of polluting Israel's nationwide water system. * On
the other hand, on June 23, 19&9, Israeli commandos destroyed part of the
$21 million East Ghor irrigation canal in northern Jordan, which irrigates
54 per cent of the Jordan valley farmland on the east bank of the Jordan
River.
It is clear then, that both participants utilize intensive attacks
aimed either directly or indirectly against civilians. The relevant question
then (disregarding for the moment the issue of reprisals), is to what level
of violence should civilians be subjected by participants engaged in or com-
batting a resistance or liberation movement.
Humanitarian concepts call for the avoidance or at least the minimization
of the employment of highly destructive violence against noncombatants . As
Professor Lauterpacht has stated:
It is clear that admission of a right to resort to the creation
of terror among the civilian population as being a legitimate
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object per se would inevitably mean the actual and formal end
of the law of warfare. For that reason, so long as the assumpt-
ion is allowed to subsist that there is a law of war, the pro-
hibition of the weapon of terror not incidental to lawful
operations must be regarded as an absolute rule of law. *-l-5
In modern warfare, in a sense, it can be said that virtually the whole
population is an effective base of power and so the doctrine of military
necessity can be used to justify widespread attacks against noncombatants
.
While this approach may be somewhat justified in a situation of total war-
fare such as in World War II, such arguments are not so persuasive in situa-
tions involving limited hostilities. In fact, in cases of limited hostilities,
attacks on enemy nonbelligerents actually contravene one of the basic princi-
ples of warfare, that of economy of force. Instead of helping to bring the
hostilities to a close, such means of conflict tends only to intensify the
level of destruction and makes a pacific approach more difficult. In the
Middle East conflict, the Israelis hope to break down the will of the Pales-
tinians to resist. The Palestinians, for their part, wish to convince the
populace of Israel that steps must be taken to accord "justice" to the
Palestinians. Trying to accomplish these goals with terror tactics against
civilians have not proved to be effective. Instead, these attacks only
harden the will of the people on both sides against the objectives of the
other
.
Even if agreement is reached on the principle that noncombatants should
not be legitimate subjects of attack in the case of hostilities involving
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resistance or liberation movements, there is still a problem of distinguishing
between combatants and non-combatants as sometimes the line between them
becomes somewhat blurred. " However, this fact should not deter attempts
to make a rational distinction between the two groups.
In the factual situation under study, in the case of the Palestinians,
only those who actively participate in fedayeen activities, either full or
part-time, as well as any others who directly engage in attacks against
Israeli targets should themselves be proper targets of attack. Those Pales-
tinian civilians v/ho merely provide funds or logistic support should not be
legitimate subjects of attack. In the occupied areas, in view of the pro-
visions in the Civilians Convention prohibiting the settlement of the occu-
217pant s citizens in such areas, ' it would appear that any Israeli national,
whether he be uniformed or in a para-military kibbutz or other settlement,
should be regarded as a proper subject of attack. In Israel, only uniformed
members of the armed forces should be considered as legitimate subjects of
attack
.
It is recognized that an argument can be made that since a large portion
of the adult population of Israel, both male and female, have been militarily
trained and are in the active reserve, subject to being called to active
service at any time, they should be proper subjects of attack, whether or not
they are on active military duty at the time of the attack. If this argument
is to be accepted, then what about adult Palestinians who are not fedayeen?
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In a couple of months time they could be trained military men, so why not
permit attacks on them before they can be brought under arms? And why
shouldn't the children receiving Al Ashbal training be proper subjects of
attack? The only logical answer is to simply draw the line between those who
are on active military duty and those who are not. To attempt to formulate
any other guidelines would only lead to constantly more irrational claims and
counterclaims to the inclusion of more and more categories of civilians as
lawful subjects of attack. An example of the extremes that such claims can
reach is illustrated by the explanation of SS Major General Otto Ohlendorf,
at his war crimes trial, as to why Jewish and gypsy children had to be killed:
I believe that it is very simple to explain if one starts
from the fact that this order did not only try to achieve
a /temporarvy security but also a permanent security
because for that reason the children were people who would
grow up and surely being the children of parents who had
been killed they would constitute a danger no smaller than
that of their parents . ^lo
B. Claims of the Participants as to Enemy Resources
T^hat are Legitimate Objects of Attack
Since war cannot be waged without the expenditure of material resources,
a usual claim of any belligerent is to deprive the enemy of resources by
means of destruction or capture. While the loss of particular resources
may have the incidental effect of depriving the civilian population of cer-
tain values, unless the likely effect would be serious injury or death to
civilians, humanitarian considerations would not prohibit such attacks.
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In the case of the fedayeen , arras supplies and storage areas, guerrilla
camps and other similar resources would be legitimate targets of attack. In
the occupied areas, any resources that are of benefit to the Israelis would
be proper objects of attack. In Israel, all military or civilian resources
would appear to be proper objects of attack.
A question then arises as to what attacks on resources are legitimate if
serious injury or death to civilians is likely to result as an incident of
the attack. In the case of total warfare, such as was encountered during
World War II, so long as the object of attack was a legitimate target, such
as a factory, for example, the fact that many civilians would be killed as
a result of the attack was not considered to render the strike unlawful.
However, in the more limited context of guerrilla warfare, such incidental
destruction of human lives should not be regarded as justified unless as an
incident of an attack on a genuine military resource . A genuine military
resource might be defined as one that is actually being used for military
purposes or which is of such a nature that its only practical use would be
military in nature.
Applying this criteria, attacks such as those made against the El Al
airliners and those aboard them would be considered unlawful since at the
time of the attacks, the planes could not be said to be genuine military
sources. The planting of bombs, mines, and other explosive devices in public
places, on roads, or in other places where enemy civilians are likely to be
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killed or seriously injured by the explosion would likewise "be unlawful. On
the other hand, a military office "building or camp could he attacked or
blown up despite the fact that some civilians may be killed. A belligerent
cannot be permitted to obtain immunity from attack against his military in-
stallations by such devices as hiding them among civilians or by employing
civilians to work therein.
C. Appraisal and Recommendations
After the close of the June 1967 hostilities, attacks of the fedayeen
were small in scale and were directed primarily against military targets.
If Israel had limited its reply to counter-attacks only against the attacking
fedayeen
,
they probably would still be capable_ of making only small scale and
largely ineffectual attacks. Instead, pursuing a policy calling for large
scale reprisals, the Israelis bombed and shelled refugee camps and even
engaged in large scale ground attacks such as the attack against Karamah.
The result was predictable. Violence begets violence. There were reprisals
and counter- reprisals in an ever ascending spiral. The end product of the
wholesale use of reprisals by each side has been widespread destruction and
loss of lives. At the same time, neither of the participants appear to be
any closer to the accomplishment of their objectives than they were after
the June war.
During World War II, it was learned that reprisals against the inhabitants
of occupied territories resulted in the massive destruction of human values
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without any corresponding military gains. The result was a prohibition
against reprisals against inhabitants being included in the Geneva Civilian
Convention. Since then, the additional experience gained during the various
wars of national liberation or resistance tend to show that the same pro-
hibition should be extended to all participants in all hostilities involving
resistance or liberation movements.
If agreement cannot be obtained as to the complete abolition of
reprisals in the prosecution of such hostilities, then at least some strict
limitations on their use should be seriously considered . Reprisals should be
permitted, if at all, only for specific and well documented serious violations
of the laws and customs of war by the other participant. A mere allegation
of repeated and continuing violations by the other side should not be suf-
ficient . Reprisals should be required to be of a proportionate nature and
be reasonably near, in point of time and selection of type of target, to the
occurrence that constitutes the justification for the reprisal. Most impor-
tant of all, reprisals directed against civilians should be prohibited alto-
gether. Details concerning these and any other restrictions on the use of
reprisals should be clearly spelled out in an appropriate convention.
In addition to restrictions on the use of reprisals, controls should
also be established to place reasonable limitations on the levels of violence
that may be lawfully resorted to by participants in hostilities involving re-
sistance or liberation movements. The goal of such restrictions should be to
minimize, as much as possible the destructiveness of such hostilities, so far
as noncombatants are concerned.

9h
VII . CONCLUDING APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is a truism that the best way to prevent war is to eliminate its
causes. However, that cannot always be easily accomplished. In the case of
the Palestine problem, the root cause of the conflict must inevitably be
identified as Zionism. It is clear that real peace can be brought to the
Middle East only by the elimination of Zionism, with its promotion of an
exclusive set of values, and by the establishment in Palestine of a bi- national
state that will protect and promote the inclusive interests of all its citi-
zens, including the displaced native Palestinians, no matter what their
ethnic or religious background. ^19
While it is the hope of all peace-loving people that the Arab- Israeli
conflict will soon be brought to a close, Israeli military and political
strength renders this a highly unlikely eventuality. Rather, it is probable
that the conflict will continue, with gradually increasing intensity, for
some time to come. As the conflict intensifies, more and more people not
directly involved in the hostilities are likely to suddenly find themselves
victims of the conflict
.
The resistance movement of the Palestinian people is not a completely
unique situation. There are resistance or liberation movements in different
stages of development in Southeast Asia and in various other parts of the
world. Such movements are also likely to develop in many other areas, such
as in Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa, where, as in Israel, the govern-
ment promotes the exclusive values of the ruling class, rather than the
inclusive values of all the people.
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The drafters of the 19^9 Geneva Conventions, with the World War II type
of resistance movements in mind, included provisions to provide some degree
of protection for such forces in future coercive situations. However, sub-
sequent experience involving modern resistance and liberation movements
indicates that additional provisions are needed to deal with this type of
warfare
.
What is urgently needed is a new convention specifically concerned with
rules to be applicable to resistance or liberation movements . Such a con-
vention should contain specific guidelines to assist in the differentiation
between an insurrection or common criminal bands and resistance or liberation
movements whose members should be accorded the status of lawful combatants
.
Such a convention should also provide for definite limitations on the types
and intensity of violence that may be utilized by members of a resistance or
liberation movement and by the forces that are combatting such a movement
.
In any new convention or in the case of revisions of existing ones,
there must be a balancing of the interests, advantages, and disadvantages
of the participants in coercive situations involving resistance or libera-
tion movements, with an emphasis on a reduction in the levels of permissible
violence to which either side may resort. Such a balancing is necessary
because if an attempt is made to give a relative advantage to one side or
the other, the side that is disadvantaged would be likely to ignore the
rules, resulting in the other participant doing likewise.
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One of the ultimate goals of mankind is the creation of a world order
system in which all disputes with international implications will "be settled
in a pacific manner. However, it must be recognized that the implementation
of such a system may he many years away. At the present time, while efforts
to eliminate the causes of any coercive situation are extremely important,
whether the conflict is in the Middle East, Vietnam, Nigeria, or in any other
troubled area of the world, there also is a pressing need for an increased
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